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This historical analysis concerns the final ground engagement of the Korean War 
from 24-27 July 1953 at the outpost known as Boulder City. During this period, 
Marines from George Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment withstood a 
continuous assault by a reinforced Chinese regiment. The purpose of this 
analysis is twofold. First, this battle provides a single case descriptive case study 
as to the linkages between the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of war. 
By providing the full Strategic, Operational and Tactical context to this battle, the 
second purpose of this analysis is to clarify the historical record concerning this 
battle and demonstrate the political motivations which orchestrated it as the final 
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Roughly twenty miles inland from the western coast of the Korean 
peninsula in what is now the demilitarized zone separating North Korea and 
South Korea rests a hill with large granite boulders near its crest. Located at map 
coordinate 52S CT 0860 0780 in an area known as Panbudong, the hill is 
bisected north-south by the 38th parallel sitting only a few hundred feet south of 
the international boundary, making it South Korean territory.1 At 119 feet in 
elevation, it is distinguishable from adjacent hills only by the granite outcropping 
near its crest. Compared to the surrounding landscape of modern Korea, this hill 
is a rather unremarkable terrain feature.  
This hill, however, has an important place in both Asian and American 
history. Part of what makes it significant is the fact that it overlooks a north-south 
corridor that was once used by Mongol invaders in their conquest of the 
peninsula. This same corridor was used again in June, 1950, when North Korean 
forces marched toward Seoul in their invasion of South Korea at the outset of the 
Korean War. In July, 1953, during the final days of that war, this hill cemented its 
place in American history. However, this episode has been largely overlooked 
except by those who were there in the final brutal days of the Korean War. 
                                                
 
1 Army Map Service (AMS), Type F (AMS 2) 1946, Series L 751, Sheet 6527 I, Korea 1:50000, Musan-Ni. 
It should be noted that the map reference point for this specific location is from the AMS L751 series of 
1946 which was created from data collected during the Japanese Imperial Land Survey of 1933. This data 
set, also known as the Tokyo B, is slightly different from the World Geodetic System (WGS) in use today. 
The WGS location for this hill is 52S CH 0840 0853.   
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Known then as Boulder City, this hill was the sight of one of the most 
vicious battles in the history of the US military. During 24-26 July 1953, the 
Marines of George Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine 
Division withstood a massive combined arms assault which came at the hands of 
a Chinese force many times their size.2 During three nights of ferocious, often 
hand-to-hand combat, George Company lost 36 Marines killed, scores wounded, 
and several declared missing or captured as prisoners of war.3 When the firing 
ceased, Boulder City was littered with American and Chinese dead, making the 
hill a macabre landscape that showcased the destruction of the preceding days. 
This battle decimated the ranks of George Company and the ranks of several 
other infantry companies that were sent to reinforce the hill to keep it from being 
completely overrun. Within the first few hours of the battle, George Company was 
down to 25% of its effective strength and a separate company suffered 35 killed 
and wounded in an attempt to reinforce the Marines struggling to maintain control 
of the hill.4  
The intensity of this battle was remarkable by today’s standards. Were a 
modern day Marine Corps infantry company to suffer human loss equivalent to 
                                                
 
2 Command Chronology, 3rd Battalion 1st Marines, July 1953.  
3 Compilation of Unit Diary Reports from George Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, 24-28 July 1953;  
Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office, Report for United States Marine Corps UnAccounted 
For, 28 October 2011. Following this battle, there were 24 George Company Marines and one Navy 
Corpsman listed as MIA. Of these, two Marines and the Corpsman were captured as POWs and later 
returned to US control. The remains of 13 Marines were found and identified after the battle. Of the 
remaining eleven Marines, the remains of six were incrementally identified and returned. Three were 
returned in February 1955, one in May 1955 and the other two in May 1957. Five George Company 
Marines remain unaccounted for. In addition to these George Company Marines, there are two additional 
Marines unaccounted for from the same night of action. One is from F 2/1 and the other is from H 3/1 on 
nearby hill 111.  
4 1st Marine Regiment, Special Action Report (SAR) “Berlins” 8 August 1953, pg 3-4.  
 
 3 
that which was exacted from George Company, it would be a national sensation. 
This is evidenced by the aftermath of the 6 August 2011 helicopter crash in 
Afghanistan that left 30 American servicemen, mostly Navy Seals, dead: within 
hours of the crash, media outlets focused breaking news coverage on the event, 
and within a matter of days, the American public knew the names of all killed and 
were given glimpses into some of their personal lives.  
This was not the case for the American and Chinese dead at Boulder City. 
Their deaths were anonymous to all except those who knew them. The only 
popular media chronicle of the fighting at Boulder City was a short photo essay in 
the 10 August 1953 edition of Life magazine.5 In this account, however, as has 
been the case in nearly all narratives focusing on the Korean War in late July 
1953, the heavy losses of American and Chinese life at Boulder City were 
overshadowed by an event deemed more significant. This event was the signing 
of the Armistice at nearby Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. This agreement, which 
had been years in the making between United Nations and Communist 
negotiators, effectively ended combat operations on the Korean peninsula.   
The location of the Armistice signing at Panmunjom adds yet another 
ironic and tragic reality to the events that transpired on Boulder City from 24-26 
July 1953. The two locations were separated by less than six miles. The two 
were so close that John Comp, who was a Corporal with George Company on 
Boulder City, recalls that in the nights before this final battle he saw the night sky 
                                                
 




being illuminated by the lights from the Peace Village at Panmunjom. Comp 
states, “We could see the lights at Panmunjom…you couldn’t get shot if you were 
on the road to Panmunjom.”6 In this statement Comp references the no-fire zone 
that had been established in the immediate area of the Peace Village at 
Panmunjom. However, Comp and his fellow Marines of George Company would 
enjoy no such luxury in the final days of the war. The no-fire zone that had been 
established for the peace talks at Panmunjom did not apply to those on nearby 
Boulder City. As the final details of the Armistice were being negotiated before 
the agreement was to be signed, hand-to-hand fighting raged in the trenches of 
Boulder City.7 Although it was just a few miles from the Peace Village, Boulder 
City was far from peaceful.  
This battle is eerily reminiscent of the conclusion of World War I, in which 
combatants were sent to their deaths up until the final moments of the war for no 
definable gain. As such, it can be argued without engaging in speculative history 
that this battle too is a fight that did not have to be. The major tenets of the 
Armistice had been previously agreed upon by negotiators and there was to be 
little gained by the capture of Boulder City.8 With the major agreement having 
been reached, leaving only relatively minor details, there existed a sentiment that 
the end of the war was near. Despite this, the agreement was not yet cause for 
celebration, because, as John Comp asserts, “We knew what was coming, that 
                                                
 
6 Author interview with John Comp, 9 November 2010, Woodbridge, Virginia. 
7 Command Diary, 1st Marine Division, July 1953, pgs 9-10.  
8 U.S. Military Academy, Operations in Korea, (West Point: Department of Military Art and Engineering, 
U.S. Military Academy, 1956), pg 51. 
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the end was near…when we got up there they told us to be on the alert because 
they expected an attack, and they were correct…you knew something was going 
to happen.”9 George Broadhead, who was a corporal with How Company 3/1 on 
nearby Hill 111 recalls, “I’ve always felt the [communists] knew for some time 
they were going to sign the cease-fire. They were willing to lose thousands of 
more troops just to take all our high ground.”10  
Statements such as these ring true as a matter of hindsight, given the 
sheer number of casualties on Boulder City and Hill 111, but they do not answer 
the most pressing historical question as to why this battle took place. On the rare 
occasion that the events of Boulder City and of the larger offensive in which this 
battle is embedded are recounted, it is often done so in a manner that denies an 
opportunity of understanding the larger context of the Korean War. Most 
accounts simply do not portray the historical significance of this battle.  
The histories of the Korean War in July 1953 are primarily written in one of 
two manners. One focuses on the high level politics of the Armistice negotiations 
while the other is derived from trench-line observances and first-hand accounts. 
Neither of these methods provide the means of understanding the full context 
and complexity of this period. Although the political focus may provide the 
necessary context, such histories do not relay the consequences of politics in 
war: the human experience of combat. These accounts negate the human loss 
and suffering endured by those sent into harm’s way as a result of political 
                                                
 
9 Author interview with John Comp, 9 November 2010, Woodbridge, Virginia. 
10 Allen C Bevilacqua, The Last Battle: Korea 1953, Leatherneck, Vol. 86, No. 7, July 2003, pg 16.  
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decisions. First-hand accounts, however, often lack the overarching political 
context. This context is lost because the combatants are far separated from the 
political arena. For the combatants, the goal is to survive, and there is often little 
knowledge of the complex political decision-making process. Without knowledge 
of this, there cannot be a full understanding of what was occurring throughout the 
political and military battlefield that was the Korean War. Although both means of 
relaying this story are important in their own right, neither provides the full story. 
Although these methods of documenting warfare make certain omissions, 
this is not to say that these accounts are not necessary.  Quite the opposite is 
true.  Inclusion of these accounts is absolutely necessary because each provides 
a unique perspective from which a more comprehensive history may be 
developed. What these histories lack is a combination of two arguably 
inseparable subjects, politics and warfare. The linkage of these topics will provide 
the political context in addition to presenting the voice of the individuals who 
experienced warfare on a personal level.  
On the individual level, warfare is a very personal subject. Combatants 
live, form friendships, fight, and die alongside one another while forming 
memories that are often known only to those with the shared experience. Given 
the nature of combat on Boulder City, an individual’s memories of this event are 
likely to be among some of the most vivid of their lives. Experiences of combat 
such as this are of the type that is forever etched into the memory of those who 
endured them. This is evidenced by Claude Wirt who, as a Private in George 
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Company, earned a Silver Star on Boulder City. He states that, “Every time I go 
to sleep I’m fighting the war.”11  
However clear the memories may be for the individual, the accounts they 
produce are not without error. The histories gleaned from an individual’s memory 
are often the topic of increased scrutiny for a variety of reasons. Whether it is 
lack of specific recollection, embellishment, or omission, memory is not without 
flaw. Philosopher and historian Georg Hegel asserts that 
Such original historians, then, change the events, deeds, and the states of 
society with which they are conversant, into an object for the conceptive 
faculty. The narratives they leave us cannot….be very comprehensive in 
their range…What is present and living in their environment is their proper 
material. The influences that have formed the writer are identical with 
those which have moulded the events that constitute the matter of his 
story. The author’s spirit, and that of the actions he narrates, is one and 
the same. He describes scenes in which he himself has been an actor, or 
at any rate an interested spectator….Reflections are none of his business, 
for he lives in the spirit of his subject; he has not attained an elevation 
above it.12   
 
Military historian Allan Millett echoes Hegel’s statement when writing of combat 
accounts and memory from the Korean War. Millet argues that,   
The common soldier’s experience in combat has always proved irresistible 
to the readers of military history, and even the Korean War has provided 
oral historians and vicarious consumers of war with ample material. The 
genre has limitations beyond faulty memory and vivid imaginations.13 
 
Aside from the intended and unintended errors of first-hand accounts, they 
fall short on one significant front. Although these often gritty narratives work well 
to sell books, they do little to answer or convey one of the most significant 
                                                
 
11 Author interview with Claude Wirt, 5 October 2011, Memphis, Tennessee. 
12 Georg W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, (NY: Promethius, 1991), pg. 2.  
13 Allan R. Millett, The Korean War, (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 2007), pg. 163. 
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historical questions: Why? And, although it may seem folly to ask this question 
with regard to war, the failure of battlefield accounts to answer this question is 
the result of a fact as old as war itself. Combatants on the battlefield are directed 
by the authority of the state and often have little knowledge of the political 
environment which determines their fates. This is a fact that spans societies and 
time, providing a commonality between combatants on the battlefield. In 
describing his Chinese enemy on Bolder City, Claude Wirt states that, “They was 
doing what we was doing…half of them didn’t know what they was over there for. 
They was just there because they told them to go there, probably the same way 
as I was.”14 John Comp asserts that the Chinese combatants he was fighting 
“had to do what we had to do and they had no choice.”15 
The concept of a ruling or political class directing military action is a 
concept that has remained unchanged over the ages. Sun Tzu, one of the 
earliest warfare theorists writes that “Normally, when the army is employed, the 
general first receives his command from the sovereign.”16 Tzu goes on to state 
that “enlightened rulers deliberate upon the plans, and good generals execute 
them….If not in the interests of the state, do not act.”17 Tzu’s sentiments are 
echoed by the 19th century Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz in that, 
“War, therefore is an act of policy…[policy] will permeate all military 
operations…it will have a continuous influence on them…war is not merely an act 
                                                
 
14 Author interview with Claude Wirt, 5 October 2011, Memphis Tennessee.  
15 Author interview with John Comp, 9 November 2010, Woodbridge, Virginia. 
16 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans., Samuel B Griffith, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1963), pg 
102. 
17 Ibid, 142.  
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of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, 
carried on with other means.”18 The 20th century military historian Samuel 
Marshall validates Tzu and Clausewitz by arguing, “It is the nation and not its 
army which makes war.”19  
A more modern interpretation of this concept can be found in Marine 
Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1) Warfighting. This text, which forms the 
foundation of how the US military, specifically the US Marine Corps, 
conceptualizes and conducts warfare, serves as a suitable means to 
understanding the full historical circumstances surrounding the combat action on 
Boulder City. Warfighting bridges the gap between the combatant and the 
politician by arguing that the conduct of warfare is a hierarchical affair. It states, 
“Activities in war take place at several interrelated levels which form a hierarchy. 
These levels are the strategic, operational, and tactical.”20 Warfighting details the 
interrelation between the battlefield and governmental policy by describing the 
various levels at which war is conducted. It states, 
the highest level is the strategic….Activities at the strategic level focus 
directly on policy objectives….The lowest level is the tactical…tactics 
focuses on the application of combat power to defeat an enemy force in 
combat at a particular time and place….The operational level of war links 
the strategic and tactical…Actions at this level imply a broader dimension 
of time and space than actions at the tactical level. As strategy deals with 
                                                
 
18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984) pg 87.  
19 Samuel LA Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command, (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2000) pg 28.  
20 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), pg. 28. 
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winning wars and tactics with winning battles and engagements, the 
operational level of war is the art and science of winning campaigns.21 
 
The overarching theme of these warfare scholars and of Warfighting is 
that no battle is an isolated event. Each is part of a larger operational picture, 
which seeks to achieve strategic political goals. Ultimately “Strategy derived from 
political and policy objectives must be clearly understood to be the sole 
authoritative basis for all operations.”22  
With this in mind, it can be observed that the action at Boulder City did 
seek to achieve a goal. However, in order to determine the course of events and 
to answer the pressing question of why this battle occurred, it must be presented 
in the full context. Evidence from each level of war must be collected and placed 
in this context in order to reveal an explanation for this event. No one level alone 
will suffice to provide a full explanation.  
The case of Boulder City provides clear evidence as to the linkages 
between the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of war. However, these 
linkages have been largely ignored by historians, who have instead focused on 
either the battlefield horrors or the political agreement of the Armistice. Although 
these topics are undoubtedly of historic significance, they must not continue to 
prevent a full understanding of this event. It is both the political agreement and 
the sacrifices of the combatants which must be revealed if either of these topics 
is to be fully understood. Such a continued oversight by the historical community 
                                                
 
21 MCDP 1, pg 28-30.  
22 MCDP 1, pg 28.  
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is unacceptable because “In general, diplomats rarely pay for services already 
rendered—especially in wartime. Typically, it is pressure on the battlefield that 
generates negotiation.”23 
This work seeks to clarify those linkages by providing a more 
comprehensive political and military framework concerning the battle for Boulder 
City from 24-26 July 1953. This account will link this violent battlefield to the 
peaceful deliberations that were taking place just a few miles away and 
demonstrate that the two are, in fact, inseparable. Through archival evidence, 
secondary source works, and institutional and individual accounts, this work will 
link the everyday combatants to the political class that controlled their fates. This 
will explain, in the fullest detail, how and why this battle transpired as well as the 
political conditions in place which made it one of the most horrific in American 
history. As this work will provide the full context, it will refute the findings of other 
works which have focused on only one particular aspect of this period. Ultimately, 
this work seeks to clarify the historical record regarding how and why American 
and Chinese combatants paid the human toll for political decisions beyond their 





                                                
 






Although the story of what transpired on Boulder City has either been 
overlooked or misunderstood by historians, the event is nonetheless a significant 
moment in American history. However, the significance of this event within the 
American historical record has yet to be fully recognized. Decades after the guns 
fell silent on the Korean front historians have thus far failed to fully demonstrate 
how this event fits into the larger historical framework. The interrelated 
circumstances have not been fully connected by previous research. 
A major factor in this is that, on the rare occasion that this event is 
investigated, there exists a recurring issue of perception that directly effects how 
the event is portrayed. In order to understand this reality, it is important first to 
consider Leopold Von Ranke’s statement, “The purpose of an historian depends 
on his point of view.”24 This point of view will be influenced by a variety of cultural 
and ideological factors and ultimately will determine the tone in which the 
account is written. Having knowledge of a historian’s point of view is an important 
consideration when examining his or her work. This is especially true when trying 
to understand texts regarding warfare, as they are often charged with emotion.  
Just as emotions over the fighting took a toll on the Armistice negotiations, 
those same emotions are still playing out years later in the histories written about 
                                                
 
24 Leopold Von Ranke, The Secret World of History, (NY: Fordham University Press, 1981), pg. 56. 
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these wartime events.25 These texts often bear marks of the ideological divide of 
the Cold War as the emotions surrounding the conflict are still present in the 
societies that were engaged. This polarizing trend emerged as the Cold War 
developed and continues to influence texts addressing conflict of this period.  
As Peter Novick writes, the subjective trend of Cold War histories 
developed in America because the Cold War presented a crisis for the American 
historical community. Tension surrounding the polarization of power and fear of a 
seemingly imminent general war between the United States and the Soviet Union 
encouraged many historians to utilize their abilities and their profession as a 
utility for freedom. Novick notes that during this period,  
In circumstances of such urgent peril, it is not surprising that there were 
many voices in the historical community arguing for the mobilization of 
scholarship…Historians were prepared to respond to appeals to render 
patriotic service in their writing so long as the contradiction between norms 
of detachment and objectivity on the one hand, and of mobilization and 
usefulness on the other, were not posed too sharply; so long as the 
requirement for doublethink was not made too manifest.26  
 
Novick explains that in this situation, when American society mobilized for war, 
so too did its historians. The end result of this trend was that histories were 
written in defense of national values and subjective texts on the topic of the Cold 
War became the norm.  
                                                
 
25 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1990. Foot chronicles the actions of armistice negotiators and how 
their inability to understand the cultural dynamics of the opposing side lead to more protracted 
negotiations. Foot is extremely critical of the negotiators in this regard in that they were unable to detach 
themselves from their military perceptions of conflict in order to reach an agreement to stop the fighting. 
26 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pg. 315-316.  
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Despite the passage of several decades since the Korean War, the trend 
of openly subjective histories can still be observed through the examination of 
Korean War literature. Philip West mulls this trend in The American Historical 
Review by stating, “Heroic modes of inquiry have dominated most interpretations 
of the Korean War….For decades, Korean, American, and Chinese writers have 
told their stories of the war, but there is little consensus as to what really 
happened. Claims of victory, fairness, or moral superiority appear hollow to the 
other side.”27 West argues that a tendency towards heroic histories has come to 
dominate Korean War accounts.  
Under these conditions it becomes more difficult to interpret the true 
nature of events. However, much of the difficulty of interpretation originates with 
the historian’s point of view. Many historians of this period have adopted a 
conceptual framework which prevents them from accurately interpreting the 
nature of events. Whether the framework is culturally or ideologically derived, it 
will ultimately impact the historical work itself.  
This work has attempted a three-fold framework in terms of point of view. 
This approach was adopted in order to better interpret this event. Division of 
evidentiary sources into strategic, operational, and tactical categories allowed for 
a more thorough understanding of this event and demonstrated that the same 
historical event may be interpreted vastly different at differently levels.  
                                                
 
27 Phillip West, “Interpreting the Korean War,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, (Feb., 




An example of this can be found in the comparison of sources originating 
from the various levels. Here, tactical and operational sources lead the authors to 
suggest that the aim of the final Chinese offensive was to improve territorial 
position in advance of the Armistice. Lee Ballenger, who has written two of the 
most well received works on Marine operations in Korea writes of Boulder City 
that,  
For the enemy, Hill 119 on the MLR was tactically and strategically the 
logical point of attack….Had the Chinese captured Hill 119, they would 
have surely broken off truce negotiations and continue to exploit their 
gains. A victory there would have been decisive.28 
 
Similarly, in a thoroughly researched account written by James Meid and Pat 
Yingling, this sentiment is echoed while describing combat operations in the 
closing days of the Korean War. Meid and Yingling write that,    
Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese Communist 
attacks throughout most of July on the two Berlin outposts and Hills 119 
and 111 achieved no real gain. The repetitive assaults on strongly 
defended Boulder City up until the last day of the war was an attempt to 
place the Marines (and the United Nations Command) in as unfavorable 
position as possible when the armistice was signed. While talking at 
Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on the battlefront for as 
much critical terrain as they could get under their control before the final 
cease-fire line was established.29 
 
These works are among the few that discuss the topic of Boulder City and 
these authors, in particular, have made significant contributions to understanding 
the Korean War. As such, this is not to argue that these accounts are altogether 
inaccurate. Both works are well researched and provide a number of previously 
                                                
 
28 Lee Ballenger, The Final Crucible: U.S. Marines in Korea Volume II, (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Inc, 
2001), pg. 240. 
29 Pat Meid & James Yingling, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea Volume V, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1972), pg. 391. 
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unknown facts. However, the issue here concerns point of view. From the point 
of view of these authors, and their sources, the conclusions they reach are 
absolutely logical. For Ballenger, his sources were institutional records and 
personal accounts. These included his personal experiences, as he is himself a 
Korean War veteran. Meid and Yingling, as official Marine Corps historians, 
utilize institutional records as their primary sources.  
The end result of both works is that there is a thorough understanding of 
many tactical and operational aspects of the war. However, working solely within 
the tactical and operational framework excludes other possible explanations for 
the event. It leads these historians to erroneously judge Chinese intentions within 
their own conceptual framework. Matthew Ridgeway argues that this was a 
significant problem during the war as well by arguing, “One of the major mistakes 
of Korea was our tendency to try to base our strategy on a reading of enemy 
intentions, while failing to give proper weight to what we knew of enemy 
capabilities.”30  
This mistake is being recreated by historians of this conflict. Despite the 
availability of resources to demonstrate the contrary, many historians fail to 
recognize the larger significance of this event. In these particular cases it has led 
to speculation that is unsupported by evidence. In documents utilized by these 
authors, military assessments indicate that the Chinese forces present for this 
offensive lacked the capability for major offensive operations. Reports from 3rd 
                                                
 
30 Matthew R. Ridgeway, The Korean War, (New York, New York: Doubleday, 1967), pg. 243. 
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Battalion 1st Marines and 3rd Battalion 7th Marines, as well as their regimental 
commands, stand in contrast to the assessments of historians who argue that 
this offensive was essentially a land grab.  
The summary for the monthly command diary for 3/1 states that the 
Chinese offensive at Hill 119 was a “major limited objective attack.”31 The 
intelligence assessment of 3/7 for the month of July 1953 concurs with the 
assessment that Chinese forces were only capable of “limited objective 
attacks.”32 This intelligence report also states that heavy rains in the month of 
July decreased the possibility of large scale attack because battlefield mobility 
was significantly decreased. This statement is also present in Chinese 
accounts.33 
The assessments of these battlefield commanders provide an example of 
how original participants can, in some instances, have a more realistic 
assessment than later secondary interpretations written from a similar analytical 
framework. These assessments state that the Chinese offensives sought to gain 
better observation in order to launch more effective artillery barrages, but that 
Chinese forces lacked the capability to dislodge American forces despite the 
ability to be quickly reinforced. It should be noted that these commanders display 
healthy respect for their Chinese adversary, with specific regard for the Chinese 
proficiency in nighttime operations and their ability to conduct attacks utilizing 
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coordinated combined arms. However, given their first-hand experiences against 
Chinese combatants, these officers did not believe that the Chinese had the 
ability to conduct a major offensive such as some historians suggest.  
When evidence from the strategic level is incorporated with that of the 
operational and tactical levels, a more accurate interpretation of this event 
becomes possible. Although strategic sources are just as likely to portray a 
particular ideological view, they are important in depicting the larger political 
atmosphere in which an event occurs. In general, these sources allow for 
emotional separation from an event. This is a critical factor when attempting to 
understand emotionally charged issues of warfare.  
Utilization of strategic level sources is necessary to illuminate the larger 
historical aspects of a situation. These accounts can be used to bridge an 
ideological divide or correct an assumption. Incorporation of a broader framework 
of analysis, such as this, provides the opportunity to reverse the notion that, 
“Given the depth of emotions that still surround the Korean War…it may be some 
time before an interpretation conceived in the higher historiography, penned with 
an even hand, and credible to more than one side can be expected to appear.”34 
By examining the strategic context of this particular event, it can be seen 
that the renewed offensive of the Chinese was not likely intended to improve 
territorial position. Instead, it is more likely that this offensive was, in fact, an 
effort to punish the South Korean president for his release of prisoners of war. 
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Evidence of this is provided in diplomatic communication of the era as well as in 
accounts written by strategic participants. A prime example is written by General 
Mark Clark, the commander of all UN forces in Korea, in which he states,  
There is no doubt in my mind that one of the principle reasons, if not the 
only reason, for the Communist offensive was to give the ROKs a “bloody 
nose” and to show them and the world that “puk chin”—“go north”—was 
easier said than done.35   
 
Noted military historian Allan Millet provides reinforcement to Clark’s 
assessment by arguing that the Chinese were tired of war. The one exception to 
this was their execution of this final offensive. Millet states that, “The exception 
was the Chinese offensive to eliminate the Kumsong salient (July 1953), which 
served as a direct warning to Syngman Rhee and the ROK Army that South 
Korea had better accept its dependence on American military power and abide 
by the armistice terms.”36 As Millett argues, the intent of this renewed offensive 
was not to capture ground in advance of the armistice; it was meant to send a 
message. 
 Notwithstanding the need for a conceptual framework that incorporates 
numerous points of view in its analysis, there is still much to be said for histories 
which portray life experiences. Seldom is this more the case than when 
documenting the human experience of war. This is arguably the worst of human 
experiences, yet there is much that can be gleaned from an understanding of it. 
Such an understanding would demonstrate the utility and the futility, the gains 
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and the losses that are associated with such an endeavor. It provides the 
opportunity to glimpse simultaneously the best and worst aspects of human 
nature. It will demonstrate the lengths to which humans will go to help a friend or 
to inflict cruelty on an enemy.      
Throughout time, the historical community has sought to document and 
understand warfare. Given the severity of the topic, it should be no surprise that 
Herodotus, the father of history, was documenting warfare. Since that time 
volumes have been produced on great stands, and epic defeats; and entire 
societies have become familiar with terms such Thermopylae, Waterloo, 
Gettysburg, Rorke’s Drift, Normandy, and Iwo Jima. Despite the severity of the 
topic and the popularity of wartime accounts, there still exists a significant void in 
the historical record on the topic of the Korean War.  
In many regards this is attributable to the fact that the “Forgotten War” is 
“sandwiched somewhere between the ‘Good War,’ World War II, and the ‘Bad 
War,’ Vietnam.”37 This fact is particularly acute with regard to later stages of the 
war in which trench warfare became the norm. Review of current literature 
reveals a pattern which suggests that, as the battle lines stopped moving, so too 
did interest from the historical community.    
Surprisingly, institutional histories of the Marine Corps demonstrate this 
trend as well. Although topics such as the Inchon landing, the battle for Seoul, 
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and the Chosin Reservoir campaign coexist in the same war was Boulder City, 
the latter has yet to receive a portion of the interest displayed in the former.   
The Chosin Reservoir campaign alone is argued to be one of the greatest 
periods in Marine Corps history. If not the greatest, then it is quite possibly the 
most researched and documented. Here, the tactical judgment of General O.P. 
Smith and his absolute refusal, to the point of belligerence, to split up his division 
in spite of orders to the contrary are credited with saving the 1st Marine Division. 
Smith and the heroics displayed by his Marines who fought their way, as a 
cohesive unit, out of a well laid trap while Army units operating in the same area 
were destroyed is heralded as upholding the highest standards of discipline and 
military conduct.  
The standards upheld in this final stage of the war are of no less 
significance. However, for all that the early months of the Korean War did to 
perpetuate the legacy and fighting reputation of the Marine Corps, the final 
month, which was statistically much bloodier, has been largely overlooked.38 
Although the fact that this stage of the war is recognized as more costly in terms 
of personnel, the period is not portrayed in historical literature on the same plane 
of prestige. This presents a peculiar situation for an institution that prides itself on 
its historical reputation and is arguably among the best at maintaining it.  
While it is not the point of this work to call attention to the failings of the 
American historical community, it is the point of this work to help correct this 
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situation. It is to demonstrate that regardless of time period, location, or 
nationality, those who fought in the Korean War paid a terrible price to do what 
they were asked to do, often in impossible situations. It may never be known 
exactly how the Marines of George Company retained control of Boulder City in 
the final days of this war. However, the search for answers into this human 














Before the men of George Company had their futures shaped by the 
political and military realities of the Korean War, their pasts had been shaped by 
the historical realities of American society.39 Before they came to know the 
horrors of combat, they had already lived lives of hardship and adversity. Their 
childhoods had been overshadowed by the economic realities of the Great 
Depression and the national mobilization in support of the Second World War. As 
such, these men shared a common social history that was undoubtedly specific 
to their generation. This common historical thread worked to prepare them for the 
realities of war like no other generation. Historian Melinda Pash states that the 
generation of Korean War veterans  
were a generation of their own, influenced by a childhood made common 
by the uncommon events they shared—a deep and nearly universal 
economic depression and then a war of unprecedented scale followed by 
what many hoped would be an enduring peace.  Little did they know it 
then, but this historical backdrop served to uniquely prepare some of them 
to accept their roles in Harry Truman’s war over a small, squalid, maybe 
even insignificant piece of Asia called Korea.40 
 
The Marines of George Company hailed from small towns and big cities; 
some were rich and some poor. They grew up in the coal towns of Appalachia, 
the farming communities of Tennessee, and in large cities across the nation. One 
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was a Harvard graduate while another had only a sixth grade education. One 
officer had been drafted to play professional football, but voluntarily ended his 
athletic career to receive a commission. For others, their service was not 
voluntary. They had answered the call to service only after receipt of a draft 
notice.   
No matter how these men came to find themselves in Korea, each had 
been shaped by the experiences of their childhoods. Growing up during the 
Great Depression, many became accustomed to hard work at an early age. 
Faced with the inescapable economic reality of the time, “the Great Depression 
served as an effective teacher to these kids, even if most of the lessons were 
bitter to learn.”41 Some in rural areas left school for the fields in an attempt to 
support themselves and their families.42 Other families survived the hard 
economic times by becoming self sufficient and living only off what they could 
themselves produce.43 
For some, the Great Depression was only part of the hardship they 
endured. In the case of Claude Wirt, his childhood was framed by the deep 
seeded racism that permeated the South. It was a reality that impacted all 
aspects of his daily life. He recalls that,   
There were black schools and white schools, white went to white schools, 
black went to black schools. Whites rode the bus, blacks walked. We read 
the books that the white kids, when they finished with them, they would be 
going on to another grade of books and we would get them. I made it 
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alright, I just got used to being what it was. That’s all I knew….Everybody 
knows. He was brought up to know what to do and how to act, all 
that…But if you just walk off into a thicket or something, you don’t know if 
there briars in there or not. But you now know your father, his father and 
all “Yes sir, no sir” do what so and so…as long as you did that, it was 
alright, but when you didn’t do that anything could happen.44  
 
Wirt made it through this by conditioning himself to abide the societal rules of 
racism in order to avoid often violent repercussions. However, he also accepted 
that such events also happened at random. Remembering one incident of white 
on black violence, Wirt recalled that a black field foreman was shot by a white 
man simply because he had not shot anyone before. This excuse satisfied local 
law enforcement, who released the man.45   
As if times were not difficult enough, in the midst of their hardships, there 
was the Second World War. Although most George Company Marines were too 
young for military service at that time, it nonetheless had a significant effect on 
their lives. The war worked in many ways to effectively turn their lives upside 
down. As bystanders to the national mobilization, they watched as their older 
relatives donned military uniforms or took on new roles in support of the war 
effort. Typical of many families at the time, John Comp had an older brother in 
the European theatre with the Army, while Robert Easterling had two Marine 
brothers fighting in the South Pacific and a father helping to build Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory.46     
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The shared sacrifice required of all Americans at the time worked to 
promote a national identity and engrain an unshakable sense of patriotism in 
many of the Korean War generation. In fact, the unique historical setting of their 
childhoods would cause many of them to feel that they had missed a great 
opportunity to serve in the Second World War. They would, however, have that 
opportunity in Korea. For this generation, the immense patriotism developed 
during World War II when coupled with the hardships endured during the Great 
Depression had created a generation that knew and accepted hard times and 
was willing to answer the call to service for Korea. The historical factors of their 
childhoods had engrained in them a sense of hard work, self sufficiency, and 
patriotism that would be tested on the battlefields of Korea.  
A personal history that included a childhood in the United States was not 
shared by all Marines present on Boulder City. One, in particular, had a 
childhood and early adult life that was dramatically different than the vast majority 
of Marines of 3rd Battalion 1st Marines. Ultimately, the responsibility for 
commanding the Marines of 3/1 on Boulder City would fall to this man, Major 
John Canton, the battalion’s Intelligence Officer (S-2). Canton had joined 3/1 only 
days earlier, on the 21st, after being transferred from Headquarters Battalion of 
the Pacific Command.47 On the morning of 27 July, Canton would assume the 
duties of battalion Operations Officer (S-3) when the previous Operations Officer, 
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Major Robert Thurston, was wounded shortly after midnight, suffering a traumatic 
amputation of his right arm.48  
The succession of commanders from 3/1 on Boulder City would end with 
Major Canton. Preceding him had been full compliment of officers who had been 
taken out of action as a result of their wounds, and Canton would be no 
exception. His short tenure as the battlefield commander on Boulder City did not 
save him from injury. Nearly a week after the Armistice went into effect, he was 
evacuated on 2 August 1953 because of sickness, a likely complication of the 
shrapnel wound to the kidney he received while commanding action on Boulder 
City.49 
Among the list of combat commanders present at Boulder City, Major 
Canton’s life story and combat history are unique. Canton was born in 1919 in 
Brooklyn, New York to Spanish immigrants but had little connection with the 
United States until his adult life. Canton’s father had died shortly before he was 
born and as a small child Canton moved with his mother and stepfather to 
French Morocco.50 He spent his childhood in Rabat and Casablanca, where he 
became fluent in French, Arabic, and Berber, while also speaking Portuguese, 
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Spanish, and some Czech. It was not until he was a 20 year old private in the 
Marine Corps that he learned to speak English.51 
At the outset of World War II, Canton was a student in Bordeaux, France. 
Here he attempted to join the French Army in 1939. After failing to be accepted 
because of his American citizenship, he traveled to Algeria to enlist in the French 
Foreign Legion. Canton later returned to France as a member of a colonial 
battalion and rose to the rank of Corporal in the Legion Etrangere while engaging 
in numerous combat operations against the Germans in Belgium and France. 
Among these was the Battle of Dunkirk in May, 1940, in which he was among the 
thousands of Allied combatants evacuated to England in the face of a crushing 
German assault. Noting that Canton was an American citizen, the British shipped 
him to New York. Within a few months of arrival to New York, Canton had 
enlisted in the Marine Corps “thinking he would go back to Europe and fight the 
Nazis.”52 Canton enlisted in the Marines despite the fact that the US was not yet 
at war and that he did not speak English. This was the beginning of what would 
eventually be a 31 year career as a Marine.  
His eagerness to return to the fight was realized with his decision to join 
the Marine Corps, although he would be destined for the South Pacific, not the 
European theater. His service in the Legion served him well during recruit 
training at Parris Island, South Carolina, where he “picked up English along the 
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way.”53 As an enlisted Marine, Canton made a quick rise to Staff Sergeant and by 
1943, he had been recommended to receive a commission. Upon receiving his 
commission in the Marine Corps Reserve, Canton was assigned as an 
intelligence officer and fought in a number of South Pacific campaigns as a 
member of the 1st Amphibious Corps.54  
Canton returned from the South Pacific in 1944 and was augmented into 
the regular Marine Corps in 1946. Following this, he served in China, Guam, and 
Saudi Arabia, and in Korea with 3/1. Prior to his assignment to 3/1 in 1953, “his 
intelligence-gathering duties took him to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, 
Yugoslavia, and Albania.”55 His abilities as an intelligence officer familiar with 
several foreign cultures proved to be of great service to him throughout his 
career. 
Although Canton did not share the social history familiar to the Marines of 
3/1, he did share with them the identity of being a Marine. He, like every other 
Marine, shared a familiar past in that each had been indoctrinated through a 
rigorous training process that marked them as distinctly separate from their 
counterparts in the other branches of the Armed Forces. The difference began 
with location. Unlike the Army, which had several entry level training sites 
throughout the US, the Marine Corps only had three. All enlisted Marines, 
whether volunteer or draftee, attended Recruit Training at one of two Recruit 
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Depots, either Parris Island, South Carolina, or San Diego, California. All officers 
would endure their Officer Candidate School in Quantico, Virginia. These 
locations had a common goal, to build Marines.  
For the Marine Corps, this entry level training was a rite of passage for 
officer and enlisted men alike. Graduation was not a given; it was a goal that had 
to be achieved. The result of the manner in which the Marine Corps indoctrinated 
its recruits was that “the Marine Corps stood unparalleled in instilling esprit de 
corps in those who would join its ranks.”56 The training process worked to strip all 
manner of individualism from the recruits and form the group into a cohesive 
team. The reasoning for this was quite clear. The Marine Corps was “determined 
to not only achieve the highest possible survival rate in battle, but to be the 
premier branch of the Armed Forces, the Marine Corps pushed its trainees…to 
the limit both mentally and physically.”57  
The experiences from this entry level training still resonate in the 
memories of George Company Marines. No matter where they attended training, 
it was equally challenging. John Comp enlisted in New York City and unlike 
others entering the Marine Corps east of the Mississippi River, he attended 
Recruit Training in San Diego due to an outbreak of meningitis at the Recruit 
Depot at Parris Island. Comp states that his experiences from Recruit Training 
“were something to write a book about….I can remember arriving there and the 
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instructions that we received to keep us in line and I can remember the first night 
I heard a lot of crying…we had a lot of draftees that were in there.”58 Robert 
Easterling recalls that his drill instructor was a two time Purple Heart recipient 
from World War II and that, although he was harsh, everyone listened because 
“he had been there.”59   
Easterling also recalls that the draftees had a harder time during this initial 
training than did those who had volunteered. The draftees were often singled out 
for a failure to volunteer. Such treatment compounded the misfortunes of these 
draftees. Not only had they been drafted, but they had been drafted into the 
Marine Corps. John Comp recalls the process at which they were selected. He 
states that, “They had a line of people that were drafted, and they lined them up 
they said count off by threes….Every third one, after it was all over, they said 
please step forward, you are now in the Marine Corps.”60   
 Whereas the draftees’ reasons for becoming Marines had been a matter 
of chance and involuntary direction, the volunteers had many more reasons to 
become Marines. For Claude Wirt, the harsh treatment by drill instructors and the 
dangers of Korea were an escape from the hard, monotonous farm work in the 
fields of western Tennessee. He attests  
When I found out about that I said I’m not farming no more. You get up in 
the morning time when the bell rang, go to the fields. When the bell rang 
again you come eat lunch. Bell rang again, back to the fields. Rang again 
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when the sun goes down. Dusk till dawn. If I could figure out any way to 
get away from there, I would go.61  
 
Enlisting in 1952, Wirt knew little of what was going on in Korea at the time, “Just 
what I saw on the television, I thought it was just like the television. Their guns 
didn’t shoot or something. John Wayne played a big part.”62  
 John Comp echoes Wirt’s statement of the importance of John Wayne in 
determining his choice to join the Marine Corps. Speaking of how he was 
repeatedly exposed to John Wayne by way of his high school job, Comp states,  
When I was going to high school I used to work in the theatre in town and I 
was an usher. “Sands of Iwo Jima” was playing at the theatre I saw that 
movie maybe about a hundred times….I said to myself I am not going to 
join any other service than the Marine Corps….From what I had watched 
in the movie…it was a shock compared to what the movie showed…. All I 
saw was in the theatre on the newsreels…that’s the only thing I knew 
about what was going on…and what I read in the paper…fighting 
Communism and what they did to the people there, how brutal they were 
with the people. So, I was really anxious to go. I joined because we were 
at war with Korea…being in a situation where I kinda brainwashed myself 
watching the “Sands of Iwo Jima” I decided if I was going to go in the 
service that’s the service I wanted to go into.63   
 
Although Wirt and Comp shared exposure to the exploits of John Wayne, they 
did not share exposure to the overarching argument of the Cold War. Wirt 
explains that “I didn’t have no idea about that [Communism], I had heard it, but it 
was just another word. Coming from the cotton fields….I didn’t know anything 
about that.”64  
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Regardless of how or why they had entered the Marine Corps, the entry 
level training they faced was an arduous affair. For Marine Corps trainees, it was 
clear that the intense regimen of training they were receiving was in preparation 
for their responsibilities in Korea. Many George Company veterans credit this 
training with helping to get them through the war. Robert Easterling equates the 
training received with survival of the war in that, “we wouldn’t have made it, what 
few made it wouldn’t have made it without training.”65 Claude Wirt comments on 
the realism of his training and credits it for his return, “They fixed it so you would 
think you were in Korea. They did a good job of getting you back home.”66   
The course of training that these Marines received in preparation for 
Korea did not end after graduation from Recruit Training. The majority of Marines 
immediately began advanced infantry training while others went to specialty 
schools before the additional infantry training. Throughout their time in the Marine 
Corps, training would be a continuous cycle. Upon arrival in Korea, each Marine 
went through an additional course of training meant to familiarize him with enemy 
tactics and with operations in Korea such as night patrols. Even as units rotated 
from the front lines to rear echelons in the reserve, training was a priority. For the 
men of George Company, all the training was working to prepare them for their 
final test of survival at Boulder City.    
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 The reality of life for those at the tactical level is much different than for 
those experiencing war at the operational or strategic levels. While these levels 
provide safety through distance, the tactical level is where the horrors of war are 
realized first hand. At this level the combatants are routinely expected to do the 
extraordinary and the unspeakable while living in an environment that is often 
physically and, usually, mentally challenging. It is at this level that the 
combatants live and die in the human experience of war.  
For the Marines of George Company, it was an experience of harsh 
conditions, conditions set by man and nature alike. Not only did they have to face 
the hardships inflicted by the enemy, but they also had to confront the conditions 
set by their natural environment. As John Comp attests, the Korean peninsula 
was an unforgiving natural environment that was well known for its frigid winters 
and sweltering summers. Arriving in Korea in January 1953, Comp recalls, “It 
was quite cold. The first night that I slept in my sleeping bag, I got in…and I left 
my head out. I woke up early in the morning and I couldn’t feel my head.”67 The 
experience of confronting the arduous natural environment was exacerbated by 
the man-made environment of war. Regarding this man-made environment, 
Matthew Ridgeway states that,           
Conditions on the battle front now grew to resemble the fighting in World 
War I, with deep-dug emplacements, trenches, barbed-wire defenses and 
an extensive outpost line where most of the action took place. As the 
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enemy built up his artillery strength, increasing it in efficiency as well as in 
number, the possession of dominating heights, for observation, became 
more and more important, and so the fights along the outpost line were 
often bloody and persistent.68 
 
Despite the natural and man-made conditions set for them, the Marines of 
George Company accepted the reality of the Korean War and went about doing 
what they had been trained to do. Robert Easterling comments that “we’d go on 
patrol every third night, whatever we ran into we took care of” while John Comp 
states that “it was almost like a bus schedule.”69 A routine, albeit a frequently 
violent one, was not uncommon to the Korean War combatant by this stage of 
the war. Jim Byrne and Gerard Pendas write that as the Korean War stalemated 
into a more static and positional war, 
George Company, like the other 26 rifle companies of the Division, settled 
into the routine of the Western Front very quickly…men were wounded, 
men died and virtually everyone at one time or another came close to 
being a casualty; however, their sacrifices and close brushes with death 
took place in what military historians refer to as small unit actions. 
Throughout the war the main focus of any Marine was his squad and his 
platoon. At this stage of the Korean War, the squad and the platoon took 
on even greater significance.70  
 
It did not take these Marines long to confront the reality of their new 
existence in combat. Robert Easterling realized what he was in for upon his 
assignment to George Company. Prior to the arrival of his replacement draft, 
George Company had conducted a raid in which a number of Marines had been 
killed and wounded. When his draft received its unit assignments, 25 men 
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including him were sent to the same platoon in George Company. To Easterling, 
this signaled that “we wouldn’t be there long.”71 Similarly, John Comp, although 
having previously encouraged himself with John Wayne, came to terms with his 
new reality his first night in the trenches. He states that,  
The first night on line…we wound up on an outpost….So from that time on 
I played it pretty cool and I kept my head down…it was initial shock at first, 
but then the situation we found out that we were in everybody was in the 
same boat so it had to be done.72  
 
 The experiences of these Marines in combat remain in their minds today 
as vivid, personal memories. Despite the passage of several decades each 
retains pieces of his time in Korea. Among his many memories from the time, 
Claude Wirt recalls watching in amazement as a group of F4 Corsairs came in to 
provide close air support against Chinese targets. He states that “Those Corsairs 
come in and it looked like they sat down on the ground…just fly right on the 
ground and eat everything up within line….You could tell just about who was 
flying.”73 Easterling too recalls being amazed by the show provided during close 
air support runs, stating, “when they’d hit a hill with that white phosphorous, it 
would light up like Christmas.”74 
Easterling also recognized that the pilots conducting those runs sacrificed 
their safety for the sake of those on the ground. In one instance, he remembers 
that a Corsair was shot down by Chinese ground fire. The plane crashed in the 
no man’s land between American and Chinese positions. After days passed 
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without sign of the pilot, some of the men of George Company conducted what is 
now known as a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP). He recalls 
that, 
We went on patrol one night to that plane that got shot down; to make 
sure he wasn’t still there…they had already removed his body… They 
wanted to check on that airplane and make sure he wasn’t still there. We 
were to bring him back if he was still there, bring his body back.75  
 
 In addition to the memories and scars of combat, some of the men retain 
other mementos of their combat service. One such memento retained by John 
Comp is a bullet that has remained lodged in his leg since his first encounter with 
Chinese personnel in March 1953 near Outpost Esther. Recalling this encounter 
he states that,    
First combat experience was on March 19th, 1953. We were on a six man 
screening patrol around the outpost. We came from the main line up and 
we notified the outpost that we were gonna go around and screen, and we 
went on the outside of the barbed wire. We got about a third of the way 
around when we heard some noise and we stopped and it was the enemy 
on their way up to attack the outpost. The squad leader who was more 
familiar with the area than we were he told us ‘Everybody lay down on the 
slope, have a grenade ready…when you see their bodies hit the skyline, 
throw the grenade behind them and then open up on them from the front.’ 
So we waited and when they came we threw the grenades, and then we 
opened up. I had an M-1 carbine, 30 rounds, and I just turned it sideways 
and sprayed it across…After that they hollered…We turned and went to 
go back up to the outpost…The sling on my carbine got tangled in the 
barbed wire and I couldn’t get it loose, so I let it go…As I was going I got 
hit in the leg and I had to crawl up and fall into the trench.76  
 
The hit that Comp had received was a bullet. The wound was serious enough to 
require his evacuation from the front. However, when he was evacuated to a 
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medical facility, doctors did not want to risk removing the bullet because it was 
precariously close to an artery. The treatment plan for this wound was to leave 
the bullet in place and to allow the infantryman time to recuperate in the rear. 
 Not all of the memories that remain are of combat. Many are of a much 
lighter nature. Each retains warm memories of friends that they made in their 
squad, platoon, and company. Many surviving George Company Marines state 
that the bond of camaraderie that they developed with their fellow Marines in 
Korea made the experience worth all the while.  
For some it is difficult. Robert Easterling was the sole surviving member of 
his squad, so memory of his squad mates is often associated with their loss. 
However, he still recalls with joy the friendship he developed with them and the 
loyalty they had for one another. He smiles as he recounts how his temporary 
replacement did not fare well with his men. He states,  
I went to NCO school and they sent him up to take care of my squad. The 
day I got back we had a live firing problem. He got shot in the calf of the 
leg with a BAR, with one round. You think he didn’t know what he was 
doing? That was one of my BAR men…They told me he had been mean 
to them while I was gone.77 
 
No matter how jovial these veterans’ memories may be today, their 
business at the time was one of the utmost seriousness. There would be 
constant reminders for these men that theirs was a dangerous environment. It 
was one where injury and death were unforgettable realities and the act of killing 
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became almost natural.  John Comp remembers just how serious it was and how 
easily death could come, stating,  
There was an enemy that was out there hollering ‘Help me, help me, help 
me!’ and they didn’t know if it was a trap or if it was really so…Somebody 
went to go out and the burp gun went off and then they fired back and 
killed the enemy.78  
 
Citing the reality of his duty in Korea, Claude Wirt argues that when it came to 
the job of killing,  
Every job I ever learned I could do it as well as anybody….I could clean 
and kill like anybody else; better than a lot. Better than a whole lot. But 
that’s all really I learned. I already know how to get along with people. But 
they taught you that. They taught you how to kill if you wanted to. And I 
learned that good.79 
 
There would be periods of respite from the violence and uncertainty that 
characterized life in the trenches. Units rotated on and off the front while 
individuals earned rest and relaxation periods in Japan. In May 1953, the entire 
1st Marine Division, with the exception of the 11th Marines artillery, was rotated to 
the rear and replaced by the US Army’s 25th Infantry Division.80 Upon relief from 
the front, the regiments and battalions of the division retired to camps far 
removed from the front where they began a rigorous training cycle.81  
Despite training as if they would soon return to the front, many of the 
Marines felt as if the war would soon be over. Soon, they would spend early July 
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1953 celebrating Independence Day.82 However, the 25th Infantry had been 
fiercely engaged in the area previously occupied by the Marines. During this, a 
number of positions had fallen to Chinese control and “word like that gets 
around.”83  
In echelon, the Marines units began to return to the front in early July, in 
the order in which they had been relieved months earlier. Soon it would be 
George Company’s turn. It was ordered to Boulder City to relieve George 
Company, 3rd Battalion 7th Marines, a battalion that had suffered heavy 
casualties in previous weeks’ fighting.84  
John Comp remembers when he was told, about Boulder City, that “they 
wanted to make that part of the main line of resistance because when the treaty 
would be signed, the positioning of the dividing of the property would be from the 
main line of resistance.”85 Robert Easterling recalls that soon before receiving 
orders to Boulder City, his platoon had received its beer ration. He states, “We 
had just got it in the creek, sat it in the cold water. They called us and said stand 
by to fall out, light marching pack and a small supply of ammo. We had to leave 
all that beer…made somebody happy.”86 Others would not be so happy. James 
Everson, a sergeant with George Company’s machine gun section had heard the 
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rumors about what was happening at the front and had a grim premonition of 
what was to come when he noticed that “the regimental chaplain was there to 
give us general absolution. Now we had good reason to be nervous.”87 Upon 
arrival on Boulder City, Claude Wirt noticed that the Marines being replaced were 
shell shocked, stating that “just any little thing they would jump.”88 The Marines of 
3/7 had good reason to be jumpy after what they had recently endured. Wirt and 
his fellow Marines of George Company 3/1 would soon know for themselves why 
the 3/7 Marines behaved this way.  
The outpost on Boulder City consisted primarily of a trench that had been 
cut into the hillside below the crest. The Marines had individual fighting positions 
carved into this trench. The only overhead protection that was provided was in 
two locations on the reverse slope. Here were the company command post and 
aid bunkers. During the following nights, the aid bunker would exceed its 
maximum capacity. 
To the northeast was Hill 111, now occupied by How Company, 3/1. 
Further to the northeast was the Hook, a hill bitterly fought over by George 
Company several months earlier. To the north was a few hundred yards of low 
ground that had been partially flooded by recent heavy rains.  To the west were 
positions occupied by elements of the 1st, 7th, and 5th Marine Regiments. Boulder 
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City, together with these positions and Hill 111, formed a mutually supportive 
defensive arrangement.  
This arrangement did, however, have a weakness that would be exploited 
during the Chinese attack. This was the result of the Chinese capture and 
occupation of outposts Berlin and East Berlin, which lay directly to the north. 
From these captured outposts, the Chinese massed forces and attacked along 
two primary avenues of approach. One would be directed against the western 
flank of Boulder City while the other would attack the eastern flank. 
In addition to these weaknesses, there was another section of the hill that 
presented a constant danger to the Marines. On the forward slope facing the 
Chinese position was a section where solid rock prevented a trench from being 
dug. This section had been nicknamed “76 Alley” because the Chinese had 
registered a 76mm recoilless rifle on this location and were constantly on watch 
for anyone attempting to cross. Lieutenant Robert Werckle, a platoon 
commander in George Company, would learn the accuracy of this weapon as he 
tried to sprint across this area on his way to the company command post on the 
23rd. 
Although wounded, Werckle faired much better than his fellow officers of 
George Company. This early injury would take him out of action before the main 
battle.89 Some of these officers would have an extremely short tenure with 
George Company. Lieutenant Robert Herlihy, who had joined George Company 
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on July 11th, would be killed on Boulder City only two weeks later.90 Another 
platoon commander, Lieutenant John Leonhart, would be among the first killed 
on Boulder City, while trying to repair a damaged mortar tube.91 Leonhart had 
joined George Company only days before Herlihy.92 In addition to Werckle, 
Herlihy, and Leonhart, George Company’s commanding and executive officers 
would be wounded and Lieutenant Robert Flieschner would be wounded twice 
during the action on Boulder City.93  
From the initial Marine occupation of Boulder City by 3/7, those in 
command would quickly be taken out of commission. The first would be the 
company commander of George Company 3/7, Captain Hall. When Hall was 
wounded on the morning of the 23rd, command would pass briefly to Hall’s 
executive officer and then, by way of seniority, to First Lieutenant Oral Swigart, 
the company commander of George Company 3/1. Early during the initial 
assault, Swigart was rendered temporarily unconscious by an artillery round 
which landed close to his position.94  
Following Swigart was Captain Louis Sartor, the Commanding Officer of 
Item Company, 3/1, which reinforced George Company shortly after midnight on 
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the morning of the 25th.95 Before reinforcing George Company on Boulder City, 
Sartor’s Item Company had suffered heavy casualties when the Chinese 
intercepted a radio message and concentrated artillery and mortar fires on the 
approaches to Boulder City.96 Captain Sartor, too, would be wounded by artillery 
on Boulder City. 
At 1100 on the 25th, Major Thurston, the Operations Officer for 3/1, 
assumed command of Boulder City and “commenced reorganization of George 
and Item companies, into (4) platoons.”97 Major Thurston would suffer an 
amputation of his right arm and command of the hill would then pass to Major 
John Canton, the battalion Intelligence Officer. Canton would be in command of 
Boulder City when the final Chinese assault was repulsed. At this time, Canton 
was wounded and command of Boulder City passed to the Commanding Officer 
of Dog Company, 2nd Battalion 7th Marines, which had been placed under the 
operational control of 3/1 in order to reinforce Boulder City. Dog Company would 
oversee the hill for the final hours of the war. 
The Chinese artillery raining down on Boulder City was relentless and 
caused a large number of the company’s casualties. John Comp recalls that 
“Boulder City was just like the end of the world happened.”98 The 1st Marine 
Regiment later noted that Chinese artillery began impacting Boulder City at 0900 
on the 24th. This sporadic fire would increase to a rate of 3 to 5 rounds per 
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minute by 1030 and “By 1500, it became apparent that the enemy was 
registering mortars and arty of all calibers on Hill 119, and that an attack that 
night was imminent.”99 Chinese artillery continued shelling Boulder City well into 
the evening and also targeted the protective barbed wire around the outpost. 
Soon thereafter, Chinese ground forces were seen massing for an attack and by 
“1915 [artillery] was falling on the position at an estimated rate of 5 to 10 [rounds] 
per minute.”100  
 The Chinese ground assault began at 2050 with a diversionary attack 
against Hill 111, while a company sized element attacked the western flank of 
Boulder City.101 During this time on the western flank, an artillery round killed 
Private Herbert Bazley and wounded Robert Easterling. A piece of shrapnel tore 
through Bazley’s neck, killing him instantly and penetrating Easterling’s skin 
under his flak jacket. He remarked that, “If I hadn’t had that on it [would have] 
probably went plum through me” but that  “it was too hot to leave, they were 
everywhere”102 John Comp recalls the relentlessness of the combined infantry 
and artillery assault, stating that,    
When they started bombarding us…they don’t let up and charge, they 
charge while they’re bombarding…we were told that you had to start firing, 
just hold down a minute and get up and start firing even if the shells were 
coming in, because they were coming.103 
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 Although this attack would be briefly repulsed with the assistance of tanks 
and mortars positioned on Boulder City, it would be costly to the defenders and 
would be followed almost immediately by an attack twice its size. During this 
initial attack, Lieutenant Leonhart was among those killed and “four machine 
guns and two 60mm Mortars were knocked out of action.”104 The loss of these 
weapons in the defense of the hill would be costly in the coming moments.  
 At 2100 the Chinese attacked with renewed intensity against the western 
flank of the position. Easterling describes the chaos of this attack, in which he 
was wounded again:  
Rounds going off everywhere. Machine guns going off, burp guns, 
browning automatics, grenades….I’m sure our artillery got as many of 
them as they could carry back. I got it with a burp gun, face, hands, 
shoulder. It was pretty thick around there then. They were all over the 
hillside. But somebody held on.105  
 
The 1st Marine Regiment report on Boulder City states that during this renewed 
attack Easterling’s squad “held its position in the line until it was completely 
annihilated by a numerically far superior enemy force.”106  
 Elsewhere on the hill, similar situations were being presented to the 
Marines of George Company. The Chinese infantry had penetrated several 
portions of the trench line and as the Marines “manned their fighting positions, 
they had no way of knowing if they were fighting alone or if the line was holding. 
The battle was now between two or three Marines and small bands of Chinese 
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soldiers.”107 Claude Wirt explains that during this period, control of the trench 
became a back-and-forth exchange: “Finally they overrun us…we’d take it 
back…they’d overrun us…them was good brave soldiers there.”108 Recalling the 
action for which he would later receive the Silver Star, Wirt says,  
Me and Sergeant Butler was going back, they said they had broken 
through the lines over there…we started back through there, kinda like a 
little tunnel and we started back through there and just hit everything up 
that come through….Everything that we met. We went over there to get a 
friend of ours, and everything we came in contact with on the way over 
there we dropped them….Some of them had even gotten behind us, they 
had run clean over us….I didn’t really know I was shot for a long time. It 
was almost day when I found out I was shot. There was blood 
everywhere, but I couldn’t figure out where it was coming from. My boot, 
every time I walked…sounded like I had gotten in some water…that’s 
when I found out I had a hole in my leg.109 
 
Richard Johnson, a member of a .30 caliber machine gun team, 
remembered that in this situation “We couldn’t go any place, so we made up our 
minds that we would either hold or die. I guess we all figured we would die. I 
know I wasn’t scared anymore.”110 One member of Johnson’s three man 
machine gun team would be killed during the night while he, Carl “Dutch” 
Bartholomew, and Hospitalman Third Class Joseph Binic would be among the 
last Americans taken as prisoners of war. Although all would later be repatriated, 
Bartholomew and Johnson had both been seriously wounded by grenades before 
they were captured. Still, this could have been much worse for these men: 
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Johnson remembers that a Chinese officer prevented him from being executed 
upon his capture.111     
Some of the men would fight with other Marines by their side while others 
would be alone. Unaware of who now held the hill, Easterling explains, after he 
was wounded the second time  
I passed out for a while, for an hour or two and quit bleeding. After a while 
it got daylight and there wasn’t anybody around and I started crawling 
back towards the 5th Marines. Bayonet is all I had left…I had been shot 
through the mouth, through the neck, through the shoulder and hands, 
and I had a hard time crawling…And I wanted a drink of water awful 
bad.112  
 
Easterling would get a drink of water, but only after crawling nearly half a mile to 
a known friendly position. This trek would take him through, among other things, 
a minefield in the uncontrolled no man’s land. He would eventually be spotted by 
a Marine machine gun team that would provide supporting fire to the lone Marine. 
After he got within a short distance of this position, Marines came out with a 
stretcher and he was promptly taken off the battlefield.   
 The first night of this battle was a costly one for American and Chinese 
infantrymen alike but the fighting would continue until early morning on the 27th. 
As stated by the 1st Marine Regiment’s report, it was a dire situation for the 
remaining George Company Marines:  
By midnight, the forward portion, and left and right flanks of the perimeter 
had been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill by the enemy who 
gained the high ground by constant influx of reinforcements from 
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“BERLIN” and “EAST BERLIN.” Only a never-say-die resistance was 
keeping the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position.113   
 
Captain Sartor’s Item Company arrived to reinforce George Company shortly 
before 0100 on the 25th. This brought some help to the beleaguered Marines, but 
Item Company had itself suffered 35 casualties, killed and wounded, on its 
approach.114   
Given the severity of the action on Boulder City, 3/7, which still had 
operational control of the area, drafted an order at 0300 on the 25th to 
counterattack.115 The objective was to attack and seize Berlin and East Berlin. 
This order was a refreshed version of a counterattack order that had been 
published on 20 July and, like the previous order, it was not executed. Higher 
headquarters realized that by this point in the war, these actions had reached the 
point of diminished returns. The human toll that would have to be paid for such 
an attack would be too much for too little. So, it was accepted that, as Lieutenant 
Swigart had earlier told his Marines, others accepted that “Gentlemen, we have 
been ordered to reinforce Boulder City and hold it at all costs.”116  
Doing so would exact a horrible toll. The casualty figures for 3rd Battalion 
1st Marines for July 1953 are a testament to the brutality of this battle and of the 
final month of the war. In total, the battalion had 58 killed in action (KIA), and an 
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additional 3 who died of wounds (DOW). 117 The casualties of this battalion in the 
final month of the war stand in stark contrast to those of other battalions in the 1st 
Marine Regiment. The 1st Marine Regiment Medical Summary shows that of the 
594 total battle casualties sustained throughout the regiment during the month, 
506 were from 3rd Battalion.118 This record illustrates that 3rd Battalion had a total 
of 444 wounded in action (WIA), with 339 of those requiring evacuation. 
Comparatively, 2nd Battalion had 7 Marines KIA and 61 evacuated while 1st 
Battalion totals were 1 KIA and 3 evacuated.  
A greater testament to the brutality of Boulder City is the toll of Marines of 
3rd Battalion killed in July 1953, 36 were from George Company during 24-26 
July, most on the first night of the battle. These 36 died during the main attack on 
the outpost but the total number of George Company Marines killed on Boulder 
City was 37. Private First Class Timothy Gilmore was killed shortly after his 
arrival on the outpost on 23 July.119 George Company’s Unit Diary shows that on 
the first night alone there were 62 Marines known to be wounded.120 The 
company, which began the day with 209 Marines on its rolls, had 30% of its force 
incapacitated in the first few hours. As George Company departed Boulder City 
on the 26th, they did so “having suffered approximately 50% casualties during 
their stay on Hill 119.”121 
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 When George Company departed Boulder City, the Marines did not stay 
away long. As of 27 July, there remained 24 Marines of the company missing in 
action (MIA) or otherwise unaccounted for.122 George Company would return to 
find these men. John Comp remembers in painful detail that after the Armistice 
went into effect,   
That night we just slept up on the hill and then the next morning we went 
over to Boulder City and we went and looked, dug up any bodies that we 
could. You could tell because it was July, it was hot. The stench was 
unbearable. And the Chinese were there and they were taking their bodies 
off also. I went up there, and one of my good buddies, he was killed. It’s 
pretty tough when you see that.123 
 
Despite the best efforts of the Marines to locate their fallen comrades, not 
all of the Marines would be found. The repatriation of some would take years to 
accomplish. Of those killed on the western flank of Boulder City the Marine Corps 
would ultimately find, identify, and return their remains Edward Anderson, 
Joaquin Armenta, Herbert Bazley, Theodore Binette,  Harlan Cockerham, John 
Cupryna, and Eugene Dodge.124 Others, however, have yet to be located. The 
remains of Robert Barnhart, Edward Boglin, James Cook, George Debaun, and 
Paul Dixon still remain unaccounted for. A year after Boulder City they were 
presumed dead and in January 1956 an investigative board of officers found their 
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remains to be unrecoverable.125 For these men, the battle of Boulder City has yet 
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Although July 1953 would ultimately be a horrific month in terms of 
casualties for the 1st Marine Division, it did not begin that way. With the exception 
of the artillery regiment, 11th Marines, the division had spent nearly two months in 
Corps Reserve where many of the Marines “thought we were finished in 
Korea.”127 Given the atmosphere of life in Corps Reserve, the Marines had good 
reason to think that the war was coming to an end. This atmosphere was 
punctuated by celebrations of Independence Day. The Marines spent the day 
having field meets, playing baseball, and hosting drill competitions and some 
were able to drink their beer ration.128  These celebrations would prove to be 
short lived. Within a matter of days, elements of the division were headed back to 
the front following the loss of several positions previously held by the Marines. 
These losses necessitated the return of the division to the combat zone, where it 
would remain until the war ended.    
Preceding the fight for Boulder City, the area had been heavily contested 
by UN and Chinese forces. Two months earlier in this same area, the 1st Marine 
Division had been relieved by the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division, which was 
supported by the Turkish Armed Forces Command (TAFC). In the time that the 
25th Division had controlled this sector of the MLR, it had seen heavy fighting and 
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a number of critical outposts had passed to Chinese control. Marine historians 
Pat Meid and James Yingling note that  
No one needed to remind the 1st Marine Division that the territory it was 
moving back into was not the same—with respect to defense posts in the 
right regimental sector—that it had left two months earlier. Three of its six 
outposts there (Carson, Elko, Vegas) had fallen to the enemy in the late 
May battle, despite formidable resistance of the defending Turks. Outpost 
Ava remained at the far western end of the line, with the Berlin-East Berlin 
complex in the right battalion area. Some 6,750 yards of intervening 
MLR—more than four miles—lay in between, bereft of any protective 
outposts to screen and alert the defending line companies to sudden 
enemy assaults. The Marines were thus returning to a main line of 
resistance considerably weakened in its right regimental sector.129     
 
The operational situation that the 1st Marine Division was entering in this 
sector of the MLR was indeed dire. As elements of the division returned to the 
MLR from Corps Reserve in early July, they did so knowing that recent Chinese 
victories had bolstered the enemy’s morale. The capture of these critical outposts 
made even more dangerous the Chinese capability to launch large and effective 
limited objective attacks. The intelligence estimate for the 7th Marines, the 
regiment that would occupy the severely weakened right sector, states that 
“enemy combat efficiency is considered excellent. Morale is good….Maximum 
utilization is made of all aspects of terrain appreciation.”130 There was little doubt 
among the Marines returning to the line that the Chinese would seek to capitalize 
on these recent gains.   
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They would do so first in a coordinated effort against two small platoon 
sized positions, Berlin and East Berlin. Together, these outposts formed what 
was known as the Berlin Gate. The attack on the Berlin outposts commenced as 
2/7 was relieving the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the TAFC. The 2/7 battalion 
commander would later note that initially “we were in great shape with both 
Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some instances.”131 From 7-9 July, the 
Chinese would launch repeated attacks of company and battalion strength 
against these outposts and eventually gained control of East Berlin. Multiple 
reinforcements were sent to Berlin and a counter attack was initiated to dislodge 
the Chinese on East Berlin.132 The three days of fighting over these positions 
took a heavy toll on both forces. The 7th Marines estimated that the Chinese lost 
200 soldiers KIA during the fighting of 8-9 July and that “friendly casualties were 
nine KIAs, 126 WIA-E, 14 WIA-NE, and 12 MIAs.”133  This was a brutal fight in 
which the full use of the Regimental Reserve was required. In the chronology of 
events for the month, 3/7 notes that at one point “Practically the entire battalion, 
including all but essential personnel from Headquarters and Service Company, 
was committed on the MLR between 7-10 July to reinforce the 2nd Battalion 
(Reinf), 7th Marines.”134  
In light of the casualties sustained by 2/7 in defending the Berlin outposts, 
3/7 assumed responsibility for their defense. After a lull in fighting, the Chinese 
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attacked Berlin and East Berlin with renewed intensity. The 3/7 Command Diary 
states that 
During the period of 14-19 July the enemy situation can be classified as 
quiet….On the night of 19 July, however, the situation changed radically. 
After slowly building up his forces during the preceding weeks, the enemy 
launched a very heavy attack on COP’s EAST BERLIN and BERLIN. It is 
estimated, conservatively, that the enemy employed one (1) reinforced 
battalion to make the assault and another to hold the ground that he had 
captured. COP’s EAST BERLIN and BERLIN were lost at 0146, 20 July 
1953.135 
 
The two positions were defended by Marines from Item Company 3/7, with 37 on 
East Berlin and 44 on Berlin.136 These small elements would bear the force of a 
reinforced Chinese battalion and would suffer greatly. Although reinforcements 
would be sent to assist the beleaguered outposts, it would be to no avail. The 3/7 
casualty toll for defending the Berlins would ultimately be “six KIAs, 86 WIA-E, 32 
WIA-NE, and 56 MIAs.”137   
The commitment of such an overwhelming force to capture these positions 
illustrated their operational importance to the Chinese. For the Marines, the loss 
of Berlin and East Berlin were seen to signal Chinese intentions because these 
positions provided a logical point from which to launch additional attacks. Given 
the situation presented with the loss of the Berlins, “it now appeared that the 
Chinese might continue their thrust and attempt to seize Hill 119 (directly south of 
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Berlin and East Berlin).”138 The loss of these positions provided a grim 
premonition of what would occur days later on Boulder City. 
The Chinese tactics used to capture these outposts were identical to those 
used against 3/1 on Boulder City. The attacks began with a massive artillery 
bombardment followed by waves of infantry attacking en masse. However, the 
tactics used to defend Boulder City were significantly different than those used 
for the Berlins. Borrowing from the nearby British Commonwealth Division, the 
linear defense that had been previously utilized was scrapped in favor of a 
defense in depth. With this, units occupied positions that were mutually 
supportive so that greater resistance could be applied against an attack.   
As the reorganization of the defense was in progress, the loss of the 
Berlins was written off by commanders of the 1st Marine Division and I Corps. An 
operation order had been drafted by 3rd Battalion 7th Marines to retake the Berlin 
outposts recently lost to the Chinese. This attack, however, “was cancelled 
pursuant to orders received from higher authority.”139 The I Corps commander, 
General Bruce Clarke, would later justify this order by stating, “holding poor real 
estate for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue casualties.”140 
The task organization outlined for this counterattack shows that the attack 
was to be conducted primarily by two rifle companies from 2/7 which were under 
the control of 3/7. Easy and Dog Companies from 2/7 were tasked with attacking 
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in column in order to seize and defend the Berlin and East Berlin outposts 
respectively.141 Once the decision had been made not to retake the lost Berlin 
outposts, the new mission outlined for 3/7, minus its George Company, was to 
“withdraws left flank as directed, assumes operational control of Dog and Easy 
Company, 7th Marines and defends COP Boulder City with Dog Company.”142 
Now that the Berlin Gate previously controlled by the Berlin and East Berlin 
outposts had been compromised, the defense of Boulder City became of utmost 
importance. Boulder City was now the key defensive position and it was to be 
held at all costs.   
The next operational plan drafted by 3/7 on 23 July reflected the change of 
Divisional Reserve. The 7th Marines would be relieved in place by 1st Marines, 
and the 7th Marine Regiment would assume “missions of the Division Reserve 
Regiment,” which included security of the Libby Bridge, for which George 
Company 3/7 would be responsible.143 This plan made a significant assumption 
that the “tactical situation remains relatively unchanged” but that assumption 
proved to be false.144 As 3/7’s monthly Command Diary states, “After a three day 
lull, the CCF resumed their heavy attacks upon the 3d Battalion (Reinf) sector on 
the night of 24 July. The attacks were directed against the BERLIN COMPLEX 
(Hill #119) and Hill #111.”145   
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The 3/7 operation order for the 23rd laid out the timeline for the relief of 
positions under the control of the battalion. With regard to Boulder City, George 
Company 3/7 was to be relieved by George Company 3/1 no later than 0430 on 
the 24th.146 Of significant note in this order was the comment made regarding 
transfer of control of these positions. In the coordinating instructions, the order 
stated, “Command of Company sectors will change when major portion of 
incoming unit is in position and when mutually agreeable between unit 
commanders.”147  
Evidence suggests that the relief of Boulder City had been completed well 
ahead of the established timeline.148 This is significant because it explains the 
series of events which resulted in George Company 3/1 bearing the brunt of the 
Chinese attack instead of George Company 3/7. By the time of this attack, 
George Company 3/1 had occupied Boulder City while George Company 3/7 
began to assume responsibility for guarding the Libby Bridge. This series of 
events forever changed the course of life for hundreds of Marines. For the men of 
George Company 3/7, it meant that their war was effectively over and that they 
would spend the final days of the Korean War in Division Reserve. However, for 
the men of George Company 3/1, it meant that they would have to fight for their 
lives to see the war’s end.   
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The fact that it was George Company 3/1 occupying Boulder City on the 
evening of the 24th was the result of calculated actions on the part of the 3/1’s 
battalion leadership that were in concert with standard operating procedures for 
conducting a relief. In advance of the 1st Marines Regimental Order 19-53, the 
leadership of 3/1 had already began executing their assigned task of relieving 
3/7.149 Before the order was officially published on the 22nd, the reconnaissance 
party from 3/1 departed on the 21st from their camp in Division Reserve and 
proceeded to the 3/7 Command Post in order to begin the relief in place.150 All of 
the battalion’s companies sent an advance party, and this first echelon of relief 
consisted of 1 officer and 15 enlisted Marines from George Company.151 George 
Company’s initial reconnaissance party was followed the next day by an 
additional 1 officer and 49 enlisted on the 22nd, with the remainder of the 
company following on the 23rd.152 As a company, George Company 3/1 came 
under the operational control of 3/7 at 1945 and assumed responsibility for 
Boulder City at 2145 on the 23rd.153 
The task of guiding the Marines of 3/1 to their new positions fell to First 
Lieutenant Richard “Dick” Guidera. Lieutenant Guidera had a reputation as a 
seasoned combat officer and was one of the most respected officers in the 
battalion. Since arriving in Korea in November 1952, Guidera had spent most of 
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his time commanding George Company’s 3rd platoon. In April of 1953, he 
became George Company’s Executive Officer and had briefly commanded 
George Company until 8 July, when he was replaced by First Lieutenant Oral 
Swigart.154 After relinquishing command of the company, Guidera was 
transferred to Headquarters and Service Company, where he was placed as the 
chief instructor responsible for training all replacement personnel for 3/1.155       
 Guidera had been chosen to lead the advance elements into position 
because he had spent a considerable amount of time in this area and was 
familiar with the landscape.156 Guidera, like many of the veterans of George 
Company, had conducted combat operations in this area. For many, the outposts 
in the immediate area were of bitter significance to them. Guidera was no 
exception. He had lost Marines whom he considered friends while defending 
these positions.  
Among these was Guidera’s platoon sergeant and close personal friend, 
Technical Sergeant Walter Borawski. Borawski died in January 1953 from 
wounds received in a nighttime raid for which he would be posthumously 
awarded the Navy Cross.157 The two had formed a friendship while training in 
Camp Pendleton and that night Guidera helped carry his friend to Hill 111, where 
he would die. This part of the Main Line of Resistance already held bitter 
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memories for Guidera and more would form as a result of what transpired on 
Boulder City.      
Lieutenant Guidera’s reputation and experience earned him the honor of 
being the 1st Marine Division’s representative at the signing of the Armistice at 
Panmunjom. The event was one of high emotion for Guidera, who recalls that,  
The ceremonial detail, which was originally an honor for me, nearly had 
tragic consequences. I was one of three fully armed and loaded men from 
our side who were allowed inside the Peace Pagoda when Nam Il, the 
number two man in North Korea, walked in to sign the truce. I literally 
fought myself from walking right up to him and shooting him for the hurt 
and death he and his side had caused on both sides within the last two 
days. Frankly, I was not a good choice to be armed and inside the Peace 
Pagoda with a man, a signatory to the Armistice, who I truly wanted to 
kill.158 
  
Having spent the previous nine months fighting alongside the Marines of George 
Company and knowing what they had endured on Boulder City, Guidera wanted 
to end the war in their company. With the official end of the war still hours away, 
Guidera returned immediately to the 3/1 area because “I wanted to be with my 
Marines when it ended.”159 He made it in time to spend the final minutes of the 
war with them. A photo captured by Life photographer Michael Rougier shows a 
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Because the strategic level of war deals with political objectives, 
understanding the strategic context of this action requires appreciation of a 
myriad of political factors concerning the Korean War belligerents. 
Comprehension of these interrelated issues will demonstrate that the action at 
Boulder City was not coincidental. In fact, understanding these issues will not 
only illuminate the reasoning behind combat operations in the final days and 
weeks of the of the Korean War, but it will also illustrate that the way the Korean 
War ended was the direct result of strategic reasoning. 
It must first be accepted that, from a strategic perspective, the Korean War 
had been in the process of ending for several months before the Armistice was 
signed on 27 July 1953. The fact that the war had stalemated on the ground 
through military means provided additional motivation for political leaders to find 
a political solution. As such, a number of strategic factors point to the fact that all 
belligerents had grown weary of war and were eager to find an honorable exit 
from the conflict.  
Chronologically, the first strategic issue to be considered is the election of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States. Eisenhower’s 
presidential campaign included the promise that he would extricate the US from 
the Korean War.161 Early in Eisenhower’s administration, finding a way out of 
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Korea became of the utmost priority to the point that the administration seriously 
considered the use of nuclear weapons.162 This was not the first such 
suggestion. The realities of a stalemated conflict had prompted military leaders to 
suggest the use of these weapons in October 1952, although that course of 
action had been prohibited by the Truman administration.163  
The threat of expanding the war to include the possible use of nuclear 
weapons prompted all parties concerned to reevaluate their participation in the 
conflict. Expansion of the war, which would likely draw in the Soviet Union, was 
unacceptable on all fronts. Preventing such an expansion and ending the war 
was of the utmost priority. However, as Eisenhower sought to disentangle the 
United States from the war, he stressed that it must not be done haphazardly. 
Over the coming months his administration would seek a political solution that 
satisfied not only the communists but also the US public and leadership. 
The political atmosphere surrounding US involvement in Korea had 
changed significantly since the war began in 1950. The Eisenhower 
administration recognized that faltering public support for the war would require 
change in the way in which negotiations were conducted. The American public 
was simply tired of the war and was ready to move on. As noted by Stephen 
Casey, “polls demonstrated that a plurality of 48 percent would consider a truce 
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along the present battle line to be a success, while 69 percent now approved of 
an armistice that left Korea divided.”164 
Demonstrating the disconnect between the American and Chinese 
governments present at the time, it must be noted that as the Eisenhower 
administration discussed how to bring about the end of the war without 
expansion a radically different interpretation of his election was held by Chinese 
officials. The Chinese government saw Eisenhower’s election as a signal of a 
pending escalation.  
In particular, Eisenhower’s command of the amphibious campaign at 
Normandy during World War II was of great concern to Chinese leader Mao Tse-
tung. This fact, coupled with the success of the Inchon landing in 1950, played a 
key role in how the Chinese viewed their defense. Eisenhower’s trip to Korea as 
the President-elect in December 1952 suggested to the Chinese that “the visit of 
Eisenhower with his top military advisors, including the new secretary of defense, 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet, could be a prelude to a full-scale offensive.”165 Soon, Mao Tse-tung sent a 
telegram to his commanders warning them to prepare for defense because “the 
enemy has already decided and is actively preparing to take amphibious 
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attack.”166 Although such an operation never materialized, these commanders 
prepared for it as if it was inevitable. 
Another strategic factor that is of great significance is the death of Josef 
Stalin on 5 March 1953. Stalin had been a driving force in escalation of hostilities 
on the peninsula. His role in exacerbating the conflict cannot be overstated, 
although the full extent of his involvement was not known at the time. A 
communiqué between Stalin and Mao illustrates this involvement and 
demonstrates that Stalin sought to conduct a proxy war with the United States in 
the hope of being better prepared for future conflict. According to Stalin, a military 
engagement against the US without direct involvement of Soviet ground combat 
forces “gives the possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare 
on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in 
America and harms the military prestige of the Anglo-American troops.”167  
The role of Josef Stalin in exacerbating the Korean War in the interests of 
Soviet foreign policy is cited by some Cold War historians who say that Stalin 
favored a protracted war in Korea in order to divert American attention from 
Europe. As noted by John Gaddis, the death of Stalin left his successors to deal 
with the strain of supporting Soviet foreign policy in Korea. However, with Stalin 
dead, they were no longer obliged to heed his insistence on further support of the 
war. By describing the dominating role for Stalin in this conflict, Gaddis suggests 
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that the Chinese and North Koreans were waging war reluctantly by this time. He 
writes that, “Exhausted by the war, the Chinese and North Koreans were ready to 
end it all by the fall of 1952, but Stalin insisted that they continue fighting. Only 
after Stalin’s death did his successors approve a cease-fire.”168 
The problem which Stalin’s successors now faced was a result of the 
Soviet Union advising, training, and equipping forces in Korea with modern 
technologies such as the MiG-15 fighter aircraft. As illustrated by Matthew Aid, 
this support, particularly the support of Chinese air forces, placed a significant 
strain on the Soviets in the closing months of the war. By examining the role of 
American communications intelligence, specifically signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
during the Korean War, Aid shows how the air war became asymmetrical, with 
the US dominating the skies over North Korea. The data he provides are useful 
when examined in context of Soviet support for the war. Aid notes that as 
advances were made in American SIGINT capability “Between October 1952 and 
July 1953, American fighters shot down 345 MiG-15 fighters for the loss of only 
18 F-86 Sabre jets…during the months of May and June 1953…133 MiG-15s 
were shot down for the loss of only one American F-86 Sabre fighter.”169 
This account, although it does not deal directly with the ground combat 
operations leading up to the Armistice, provides a means to interpret post-Stalin 
Soviet perceptions of the war. The loss of these Soviet aircraft that Aid describes 
                                                
 
168 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2005), pg. 60 
169 Matthew M Aid, “American Comint in the Korean War (Part II): From the Chinese Intervention to the 
Armistice,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Spring 2000), pp 14-49. 
 
 68 
does not, by itself, signify that the end of the war was near. However, the loss of 
these valuable technological assets in such staggering numbers likely weighed 
heavily on Soviet policymakers, providing the needed justification for the Soviet 
Union to extricate itself from the war.     
Another strategic factor that must be considered is the fact that a 
protracted, immobile, positional war is not the type of conflict that Chinese 
leaders thought to be in their best interests. This had been a concern of the 
Chinese prior to their entrance in the war in 1950, as illustrated by a telegram 
from Mao to Stalin in which Mao states, “The most unfavorable situation, we 
hold, would result from the inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate American 
troops in Korea and the involvement of the two countries’ troops in a 
stalemate.”170 The attrition intensive trench warfare being fought in Korea was 
inconsistent with Chinese military doctrine because the belief was that 
Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an 
extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must 
conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive 
battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations 
and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and not positional 
warfare depending exclusively on defense works with deep trenches, high 
fortresses, and successive rows of defensive positions.171 
 
Despite the stated preference of Chinese military doctrine, an immobile, 
positional war had been in effect for some time, largely because “Early in 1951, 
the United States shifted its political objective from retaking North Korea to 
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inflicting enough pain upon the communist forces to bring them to the negotiating 
table.”172 In turn, this transformed the dominant method of warfare in Korea from 
a maneuver intensive to an attrition intensive war. As attrition became the 
dominant method of warfare, it created an imbalance between the technological 
advantages of the United Nations forces and the manpower availability of the 
Chinese. What ensued from this imbalance was a situation in which success of 
military engagements became measured in terms of numbers killed.  
It should be noted that observation of Chinese ground combat operations 
illustrates that, despite transition to an immobile war, the Chinese effectively 
incorporated remaining aspects of their doctrine into how they fought in Korea. 
Examples of operations during their early involvement in the war in comparison 
with those of the final month of the war illustrate that their tactics for achieving 
success were one and the same. Comparison of large scale operations such as 
the Chosin Reservoir campaign in 1950 to Chinese combat operations conducted 
in July 1953 illustrate that their aim was to   
In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four, 
and sometimes five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the enemy 
forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any 
escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing 
crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make 
a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of 
wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move 
its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition 
in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, 
although we are inferior as a whole…we are absolutely superior in every 
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part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the 
campaign.173 
 
 Although able to incorporate aspects of their doctrine into their conduct of 
ground operations, the positional warfare in Korea still placed the Chinese 
military in a highly untenable situation. On numerous occasions throughout the 
war, Chinese military leaders would seek to improve this situation in order to fight 
large scale operations more consistent with their doctrinal approach to warfare. 
However, the general situation was further deteriorated by the US dominance of 
the skies over North Korea. This prevented the Chinese from massing large 
forces and frustrated logistical efforts to maintain the forces already 
committed.174  
These conditions, when combined with waning Soviet support after Stalin, 
severely weakened the Chinese position and provided motivation for 
discontinuing the war. This was in part because of the way in which the army was 
viewed in relation to the state. Writings of Mao Tse-tung indicate that the strength 
of the army and that of the state were one and the same. He writes that, 
Every Communist must grasp the truth, “Political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun.”  Our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the 
gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we 
can create Party organizations…. We can also create cadres, create 
schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yenan has 
been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. 
According to the Marxist theory of state, the army is the chief component 
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of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have 
a strong army.175 
 
With a severely weakened army on the Korean front, the Chinese altered their 
political objectives from restoring the balance in Korea to ensuring the survival of 
the state. Such survival became questionable as the Chinese position in Korea 
weakened. 
Evidence exists to demonstrate that American, Soviet, Chinese, and North 
Korean interests all favored the cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula 
and that all these parties sought to end the war as quickly as possible. There 
was, however, one strategic participant that favored a continuation of the war in 
order to achieve the reunification of Korea. The South Korean president, 
Syngman Rhee, resented the possibility that a negotiated truce may leave the 
Korean peninsula divided. His resistance to negotiations along such lines proved 
to be formidable and unquestionably resulted in the continuation of the war.  
Those who routinely worked with Rhee, branded his behavior in trying to 
railroad negotiations as “The Rhee Act.” Such intolerance for negotiation on the 
part of Rhee had been well known to American diplomats for some time, since 
there had been a change of strategy away from reunification. From this moment 
forward, Rhee had persistently opposed an armistice. Although he came across 
as mildly comical to some diplomats, there was recognition that Rhee’s 
outspoken insistence that the United Nations Command (UNC) should continue 
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the war effort until the peninsula was reunified was no laughing matter. His 
statements drew on popular support from the South Korean people and became 
a persistent thorn in the side of negotiators.  
Rhee routinely equated an armistice with communist forces to 
appeasement and deplored the thought that communist forces would remain on 
the peninsula. 176  Among many of Rhee’s threats was that if the UNC came to an 
agreement with the communists, he would remove the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
military from UNC command and continue the fight, alone if need be. Rhee 
expressed this to General Mark Clark, commander of UN forces in Korea, stating, 
“The Republic of Korea Army will fight on, if it means a suicide, and I will lead 
them.”177 Such statements were written off as “The Rhee Act;” and few believed 
that Rhee was actually capable of making good on such a promise. In his 
biography of Rhee, Richard Allen notes that 
In Panmunjom, the rumbling from Seoul had gone largely unnoticed. If 
anything, the Communists must have been secretly pleased at Rhee’s 
statements characterizing any armistice as a Communist victory. Neither 
the Communists nor the world at large felt that Rhee, on his own, could 
successfully obstruct an armistice.178    
 
Although few thought Rhee could reunify Korea on his own, there was 
recognition that the UNC must be prepared to deal with the repercussions of 
Rhee’s often erratic behavior. This was especially true with regard to his stalwart 
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opposition to an armistice. The UNC preparation to confront Rhee came in the 
form of a contingency plan codenamed Ever Ready. This operation, originally 
outlined by the Eighth US Army in early May 1953, called for a military overthrow 
of Rhee by UN forces in the event that he interfered with an otherwise successful 
armistice.179 Ever Ready set three basic conditions for its execution: (1) ROK 
forces were not responsive to UNC directives; (2) ROK military and government 
pursued an independent course of action; or (3) ROK forces are hostile to UNC 
troops.180   
On 8 June 1953, eighteen months of negotiation on the provisions of 
Article III of the Armistice (arrangements on prisoners of war), concluded 
successfully and an agreement was signed between UN and communist 
negotiators. This agreement, shortly following other agreements reached on 25 
May, signaled that the war would soon be over. The final agreement was 
seemingly in sight but this most recent agreement had been reached without the 
involvement of ROK negotiators, who had boycotted the peace talks since the 25 
May.  
On the evening of 8 June, after a meeting with Rhee, General Mark Clark 
drafted a telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which he discussed Rhee’s 
discontent with the new agreement. In this, Clark outlined the threats posed by 
Rhee, including his insistence that the ROK military would unilaterally continue to 
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combat communist forces on the peninsula. Rhee did, however, agree that he 
would take no unilateral action without first consulting Clark. Regardless of this 
assurance from Rhee, Clark’s next telegram put his subordinate commanders on 
alert that they were to be prepared to execute Ever Ready “only upon my 
personal order.”181   
 On the afternoon of 9 June, Clark sent an additional telegram in which he 
stated the prospects for the final armistice agreement being signed:  
The resolution of the POW issue will now make signing of the armistice 
agreement possible in the near future and possibly as early as 18 June. In 
order to prevent needless loss of lives I intend to press for early signing, 
and [accept] the risks involved in not having the neutral agencies ready to 
move into place at the time of cease fire.182 
 
Although eager to sign a final agreement to end the war, Clark recognized that 
Rhee could still create significant obstacles. Clark expressed concern over 
Rhee’s most recent threat to not permit a neutral force from India entry into South 
Korea so that it could oversee the repatriation of POWs. This threat was one 
among many concerns that Clark faced in the days preceding the proposed 
signing date of 18 June.  
Despite continued attempts made to prevent Rhee’s interference with the 
peace settlement, the Armistice would not be signed on 18 June. This fact is the 
direct result of a unilateral action taken by the South Korean president.183 In the 
late evening hours of 18 June, Rhee quietly sanctioned the immediate release of 
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over 27,000 communist prisoners of war. ROK forces responsible for holding 
these prisoners opened the gates of the prison camps, allowing nearly all to 
escape. US Army Sergeant Tim Maddox, on duty at one of the detention 
facilities, recalls that shortly after midnight on the 18th “the gate was wide 
open…and the North Korean prisoners were running out on the double, carrying 
their ditty bags. I ran over to one of the ROK noncoms—they were just standing, 
watching—and asked what the hell was happening. He just shrugged and 
smiled.”184 The action that Maddox witnessed had been carefully planned and 
orchestrated by the ROK government. And, although the UNC had no advance 
notice of this plan, it would feel the swift and violent repercussions that soon 
followed. 
Because the repatriation of prisoners of war had been a major topic of 
debate in negotiation, Rhee’s decision to release those under his control 
prompted anger that reached to the highest levels of the Chinese government. It 
did not take long for the communists to hear what had transpired at POW camps 
across South Korea. The action caused uproar among communist leaders and 
the tone of their discourse immediately shifted from preparing to sign the 
Armistice to preparing for an offensive.  
When Marshal Peng Dehuai, commander of Chinese forces in Korea, 
learned of the orchestrated escape, he was on his way to Panmunjom to sign the 
Armistice. Delayed in Pyongyang, he was informed by North Korean officials that 
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the ROK had “forcibly seized 27,000 North Korean POWs and dispatched them 
to the front lines.”185 Major General Chai Chengwen, a member of Peng’s CPV 
staff operating in Korea, argues that Rhee’s release of these prisoners signaled 
that Rhee hated peace. He states that after consulting with his staff Peng 
contacted Mao to discuss retaliatory options, noting that Peng believed “if Rhee 
were to be let go without a military punishment, he would cause more troubles 
and further delay the truce agreement.”186Another account of this incident reports 
that “Peng drafted a telegram at Pyongyang and sent it to Mao [Tse-tung]. Peng 
suggested postponing the date for signing the truce in order to have time to 
punish Rhee and to inflict 15,000 more casualties on his troops. Mao agreed that 
signing the truce must be postponed. The right time to sign depended on the 
development of the situation. It was extremely necessary to eliminate at least 
10,000 more of Rhee’s troops.”187 General Yang Dezhi says that Mao responded, 
“When [we will] sign it all depends...but it is quite necessary to eliminate ten 
thousand more South Koreans before going to sign the truce agreement.”188  
Rhee’s release of these prisoners had been interpreted correctly by the 
Chinese as an attempt to undermine the Armistice. Mao soon sent a telegram to 
Peng and other Chinese People’s Volunteer (CPV) commanders in which he 
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stated “we must take another major [military] action to pressure the enemy side 
to assure that this type of incident won’t happen again.”189 Because it had been 
the South Koreans who had been responsible for this action, the retaliation would 
be directed primarily at their forces, namely the ROK Capital divisions. CPV 
commanders immediately modified a planned counterattack which had been 
previously scrapped after concessions were reached on the POW issue on 25 
May.  
Following nearly a week of preparation, the renewed CPV offensive 
commenced on 25 June, focusing first on an area known as the Kumsong 
Salient. Here the CPV had dramatic successes resulting in the near destruction 
of the of the 6th, 8th, and 3rd ROK Capital divisions within the first 24 hours.190 The 
scale of this offensive was unlike that of any other seen during the war. As it 
commenced, it did so over a front that was over 200 kilometers wide, hitting ROK 
forces in the east and American forces in the west.191 The manner in which 
Chinese commanders prepared and executed this operation is of the utmost 
significance. Historian Shu Guang Zhang’s description of the CPV battle plan 
bears remarkable similarity to how it was executed on the ground. He writes that,  
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The primary target, in their view, should be those US/UN positions with 
strong defense works and favorable defensive ground so that after they 
were seized, the CPV troops could hold off the enemy’s counterattack and 
decimate its forces in the process. For those US/UN positions that had no 
strong defense works or were unsuitable for defense, the commanders 
directed the troops to storm and capture them, quickly withdraw to safety, 
and then prepare to storm them again before the enemy forces 
reestablished a firm foothold. The main goal was to annihilate the enemy 
strength through seesaw battles. In line with these instructions, the 
attacking units selected fifty-six US/UN positions mostly manned at 
platoon or company strength. Each CPV unit conducted reconnaissance 
to learn the specific conditions at these US/UN outposts.192   
 
As it had been planned previously, the CPV divided the operation into 
three phases. Each was characterized by ten days of intense ground combat 
followed immediately by a week of preparation of defensive works for an 
assumed counterattack.193 The weather, a consistent factor in military operations, 
aided the CPV execution of this operation despite what would have otherwise 
been unfavorable conditions. The torrential rains of July 1953 assisted in the 
execution of these phases in that they provided the opportunity for ground forces 
to rest while severely limiting the likelihood of counterattack due to severely 
limited battlefield mobility.194  
The Chinese recognized that, as far as the political arena was concerned, 
“it was a favorable moment for China and North Korea to deliver a heavy blow to 
Rhee as retaliation.”195 The strategic message of retaliation that the Chinese 
intended to send with this renewed offensive campaign was clearly received by 
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Rhee in the coming weeks. General Yang Dezhi states that “[we] just wanted to 
impress the enemy with the ‘iron’ facts that we were capable—not afraid—of 
fighting the war [through to the end].”196 The quality and professionalism of the 
ROK military came into serious question as Chinese forces began to decimate 
entire ROK divisions, and Rhee soon began to consider the consequences of 
unilateral action. If the message sent by the CPV had not been clear enough, 
American leadership ensured that Rhee had a thorough understanding that such 
action was unacceptable. President Eisenhower became personally involved with 
Rhee, and the message of his administration was that should Rhee continue 
such actions he could no longer count on support from the United States. It was 
a message that Rhee would be repeatedly reminded of, even well past the 
Armistice.197       
Chinese leaders understood that Rhee had undertaken his action without 
the counsel of US or UN advisors. However, as the offensive made headway, the 
Chinese sought assurances that all parties did, in fact, seek the war’s end. CPV 
leaders requested assurance from General Clark on two basic questions that 
centered on their willingness to agree to the Armistice, but highlighted concerns 
that it would not be honored by the South Koreans.  
The first concern raised by the Chinese was whether if the Armistice was 
signed but subsequently broken unilaterally by ROK forces, the UN would 
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maintain the Armistice. The second was whether, should the Armistice be broken 
by the South Koreans, the UN provide support to ROK military forces. Clark 
responded that the UN would abide by the terms of the Armistice, and that if it 
was unilaterally broken by South Korea the UN would not support ROK troops. 
This response prompted Chinese officials to return to the negotiating table.  
Clark writes that as the Korean War came to an end, 
There is no doubt in my mind that one of the principle reasons, if not the 
only reason, for the Communist offensive was to give the ROKs a “bloody 
nose” and to show them and the world that “puk chin”—“go north”—was 
easier said than done….By July 19 the Reds decided they had gained as 
much as they could from their final offensive and that day they announced 
they were “prepared to conclude” discussions on the Armistice.198   
 
Within a matter of days, the Armistice would be ready to sign in Panmunjom. 
However, typical of how negotiations had proceeded in previous years, there was 
additional delay. Before the Armistice was to be signed, the belligerents had to 
come to final agreement on the mechanics of where, when, and how the event 
would take place and who would participate. These details included topics as 
seemingly minor as to how the walls were painted in the Armistice hall and what 
media outlets would be present to relay the story to the world. 
 Once these topics were settled, it was time for the Armistice to be signed. 
At 10 a.m. on 27 July 1953, General Nam Il of North Korea and General Mark 
Harrison, signing for the UN, sat at a large wooden table in the Armistice hall at 
Panmunjom. For the next several minutes they sat before a crowd of nearly 300, 
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signing several copies of the agreement. Once this task was complete they 
exited, each without speaking a word. From Panmunjom, the signed agreements 
were sent to the headquarters of Generals Peng Dehuai and Mark Clark for their 
signatures. Clark writes, “Only after I’d written ‘Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-
Chief, United Nations Command’ eighteen times with the pens the Parker 
company had sent me for the occasion did I get that ‘It’s over’ sensation.”199 At 





                                                
 






The message being sent to President Rhee was endured by nearly all 
units manning the Main Line of Resistance (MLR). The Chinese were eager to 
demonstrate their capability to continue the war, while they quietly hoped that it 
would soon end. The Chinese made assurances to units on the front that the 
fighting witnessed in the previous weeks had been only a preview of their 
capability. They insisted that, should the Armistice not be signed, they would 
demonstrate their full capability. This is evidenced in the sector controlled by 2nd 
Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, where a Chinese propaganda message, 
complete with popular American music, was played on the evening of July 26th. 
The message stated, “If truce is not signed tomorrow there will be an all out 
war.”200 For the Marines of 2/5 it had been a relatively quiet day in comparison to 
others on the line. The battalion received only 17 rounds of incoming enemy 
mortar fire. The following day, when the truce was signed, the battalion received 
sporadic incoming mortar and artillery fire until the Armistice went into effect at 
10:00 p.m. 
As 2/5 was listening to the propaganda message, elsewhere on the front 
there was still fighting and dying. There was no need to remind the Marines of 
George Company that there would be an all out war; for the past three nights 
they had lived it. The Chinese would mount a final attack on Boulder City the 
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night of the 26 July, the final skirmish for the hill ended just before 0100 on 27 
July. By this point, numerous reinforcements had been sent to the hill to ensure 
that it remained in Marine control. Although there was no further ground contact, 
mortars and artillery remained a persistent threat until the final moments of the 
war. John Comp recalls that,     
About a minute before the Armistice was to take effect they fired a 
shell…it made such an ungodly noise going over…the last shell of the 
war. Then everything went quiet…The next morning we went over to 
Boulder City and we began looking for the remains of our brother 
Marines.201  
 
The signing of the Armistice marked the beginning of a rapid, phased withdrawal 
from the newly established demilitarized zone. On the morning of July 28th, 
American and Chinese combatants would return to Boulder City to collect their 
dead. After more than three years of fighting, this first day of Armistice would be 
a horrible testament to the brutality of war. Among those coming to witness the 
aftermath of Boulder City would be a host of battalion, regimental, commanders 
as well as the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division.   
In the days that followed, General Mark Clark made visits to numerous 
battlefields on the front. At one point he gave a speech recognizing that the 
Armistice meant there was still a long road ahead. Soon, he departed Korea for 
his son’s wedding in the United States.202 His 24 years in uniform came to an end 
that year as he retired from the Army. In retirement Clark relocated to Charleston, 
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South Carolina, where he served as president of the Citadel until 1966. It is at the 
Citadel where he was buried in 1984.  
Marshal Peng Dehuai, the architect of the final Chinese offensive, 
returned to China as a national hero. In spring 1954 he was promoted to the 
position of Minister of Defense. In this capacity he pushed for professionalization 
of the Chinese military over political indoctrination.203  Within a matter of years 
Peng fell from Mao’s graces and his distinction as a national hero was greatly 
diminished. Accused by Mao of making “unprincipled factional activity,” Peng was 
demoted from his position. In 1966 he was jailed and repeatedly beaten. This 
treatment was far removed from the personal attention he had received from Mao 
years earlier.204 In 1978 Peng was exonerated of all charges against him and his 
status within the party was restored. Unfortunately for Peng, he did not witness 
this moment, for he died in 1974.205  
 The South Korean President Syngman Rhee continued his tumultuous 
relationship with the United States. His presidency was characterized by 
controversy until the end. As he had ordered the release of communist POWs in 
June 1953, he had a letter delivered to President Eisenhower informing him of 
this decision. Although it was received too late for Eisenhower to act, it prompted 
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an almost immediate meeting of the president’s National Security Council.206 
Discussion in the weeks that followed considered whether Rhee should be 
removed from power as planned in Ever Ready or allowed to retain power.207 
Rhee stayed in power and succeeded in arranging a mutual security agreement 
with the US. In 1960, mass protest over disputed elections resulted in Rhee’s 
exile to Hawaii, where he died in 1965.  
As the guns fell silent on Boulder City, the Marines of George Company 
had already begun to go their separate ways. Those severely wounded, such as 
Claude Wirt, Robert Easterling, and many others were aboard a hospital ship 
beginning the journey back to the United States for continued medical treatment 
when the Armistice was signed. Many spent several months receiving treatment 
for their wounds, although many would never heal. Whatever physical ability may 
have returned to these men, many were left dealing with the psychological 
effects of the war. Claude Wirt attests, 
I can’t sleep, I wake up fighting and kicking, thinking I’m still there. 
Sometimes, it’s all I can see…I don’t think a man ever get straight from 
actual combat…I don’t believe you ever get straight, because you lose so 
many friends. You lose guys that you would go to the devil for…I had a lot 
of good friends. You know I was kinda glad I got there, and I hated it too 
after. You get out there, you fight and you kill guys…They just like 
you…he never done nothing to you…It was just a killing ground.208  
 
Upon his discharge from the Marine Corps, Wirt returned to Memphis 
where he worked as a teamster and began a family. The true measure of his 
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success can be seen in his descendants. The family patriarch retained the work 
ethic instilled in him by his father, who did not miss a day of work in forty years of 
service to a Memphis company. The Silver Star recipient spoke only to his wife of 
his experiences in Korea, but the example he set for his family is clear. Although 
Wirt had only a 6th grade education, all of his grandchildren are college 
graduates.  
Robert Easterling spent eighteen months and endured countless surgeries 
at Bethesda Medical Center. His injuries ultimately resulted in his medical 
retirement from the Marine Corps as a Sergeant, despite his desire to make a 
career of the Marines.209 While at Bethesda, he underwent an innovative bone 
graft to replace the jaw that had been destroyed when he was shot in the face. 
This required him to be on a liquid diet with his jaw wired shut. During this time, 
his diet consisted primarily of milk shakes, which he enjoyed at first. However, 
more than thirty years passed after his release from Bethesda before he would 
drink another.   
The gunshot wounds to Easterling’s hands also required rehabilitation 
while at Bethesda. The most beneficial method for this came by way of a Navy 
Chief Petty Officer who allowed him entry to the Chiefs’ Mess to play billiards for 
an hour each day on the condition that he did not tell anyone. Regaining some 
dexterity to his hands, Easterling became a carpenter when he was retired from 
the Marines. It was a job for which the Marine Corps had trained him but that he 
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had rarely performed while in Korea. Returning to his hometown of Coeburn, 
Virginia, Easterling became a well known member of the community, where he 
“worked on just about every house in Wise County.”210          
John Comp remained in Korea for several months before being 
reassigned to an aviation unit in North Carolina. Being an infantryman, Comp felt 
he was somewhat out of place, stating, “I didn’t know diddly about the airwing….I 
was all infantry.”211 But Comp would ultimately have a career in aviation support, 
helping to design bomb racks for the Navy. After a successful career, he retired 
to Florida, where the cold winters of New Jersey would never again remind him 
of the harsh winter he spent in Korea.  
The officers of George Company went on to live productive lives as well. 
Richard Guidera spent a total of eight years in the Marine Corps. When he 
returned to civilian life, the Harvard graduate became a real estate developer for 
an upstart company that is now known around the world as Target.212 Although 
Bob Werckle had been drafted to play professional football for the Detroit Lions in 
the 1952 draft, his career in football was over once he left Vanderbilt University 
and entered the Marine Corps. In 1999, the former All-American tackle was 
recognized by the Southeastern Conference (SEC) as one of the legends of the 
SEC. Both men died in 2005.    
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John Canton, the battalion Intelligence Officer who ultimately assumed 
command of Boulder City, retired from the Marine Corps as a Colonel. Before 
doing so, he spent a considerable amount of time stationed in his childhood 
home of Morocco. Canton’s familiarity with the nation resulted in his assignment 
there as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1960. There, he commanded a detachment of 
200 Marines at the Marine Barracks, Morocco and served as a political advisor to 
the Commander, US Naval Activities, Morocco.213 In this capacity he traveled to 
the White House with King Hassan II in1961 to serve as liaison between the King 
and President Kennedy. Later in his tour, he advised the Moroccans in their 1963 
war with Algeria and was subsequently awarded the Ouissam Alaouite, one of 
the highest honors awarded by the King of Morocco. At the end of his tour in 
1964, Lieutenant Colonel Canton was personally awarded the Legion of Merit in 
a surprise ceremony orchestrated by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
General Wallace Greene Jr.     
Canton retired from the Marine Corps in 1971, after completing 
assignments at Marine Corps Headquarters and in Vietnam. Following his 
retirement, he joined his son in the creation of a consulting firm in Morocco. He 
worked in this firm, advising defense contractors, until retiring again in 1984. 
Canton ultimately settled in Florida, where he died as a result of Alzheimer’s 
complications in 2005. His death marked the end of the final battle for a man 
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described as “a Marine’s Marine,” and he was buried at Arlington National 
Cemetery with full military honors.214 
Funeral honors were not all that were awarded to the Marines of George 
Company. The ferocity of the battle was recognized in the form of valor awards 
distributed to those who had fought. Within George Company alone, the three 
nights of combat produced no less than one Navy Cross, eleven Silver Stars, as 
well as a plethora of Bronze Stars, a quantity of high level awards for a single 
action unmatched under modern standards of recognizing combat valor.  
For his actions as commanding officer of George Company on the night of 
24-25 July, Lieutenant Swigart was awarded the Navy Cross. His citation reads 
in part, 
Although painfully wounded and rendered unconscious when the position 
was subjected to an intense mortar and artillery barrage which was 
followed by an attack by an overwhelming enemy force…quickly 
reassumed command of his unit when he regained consciousness, alerted 
his platoon commanders of the impending attack and, after repelling the 
enemy, immediately prepared for another encounter. Through his 
remarkable leadership, a second vicious enemy attack on his position was 
also repulsed. Despite his painful wounds, he continued to supervise 
operations throughout the night and constantly exposed himself to intense 
enemy artillery, mortar and small-arms fire in order to direct his men 
effectively….By his inspiring leadership, marked fortitude and courageous 
initiative, Captain Swigart contributed in large measure to the successful 
defense of his position and to the accomplishment of the battalion's 
mission.215 
 
Swigart’s command successors were recognized as well. Captain Sartor and 
Major Thurston receives Silver Stars. Sartor’s citation reads, 
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 Having been ordered to reinforce another company which was engaged 
in close combat with a numerically superior enemy force far forward of the 
main line of resistance, he led his company over an unfamiliar route 
through a devastating barrage of enemy mortar and artillery fire to the 
objective. Despite numerous casualties and painful personal wounds, he 
arrived with his unit in time to attack, break the enemy assault and regain 
control of the vital position. 216 
 
A number of the enlisted Marines were recognized for valor as well. Although the 
men would rarely speak of their actions or awards, Claude Wirt was awarded the 
Silver Star while John Comp and Robert Easterling would be among those to 
receive Bronze Stars with the Combat Distinguishing Device. 
Despite the brutal combat that they endured and injuries that have 
affected many of them their entire lives, the Marines of George Company would 
have it no other way. Although saddened by the loss of their fellow Marines, 
these men are proud of their service and would not hesitate to return to the 
trenches of Korea if their country called. Claude Wirt attests that “If I had it to do 
all over again, I would go the same way I went,” while John Comp asserts, “The 
camaraderie I have with my fellow Marines and the friendships I made, it was 








                                                
 
216 Silver Star Citation, Captain Louis J Sartor. 
217 Author interview with Claude Wirt, 5 October 2011, Memphis, Tennessee; Author interview with John 
Comp, 9 November 2010, Woodbridge, Virginia.  
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